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EMERGENCY FEDERALISM:
CALLING ON THE STATES IN PERILOUS TIMES
Adam M. Giuliano*
The attacks of September 11 prompted a historic debate concerning terrorism and
domestic emergency response. This ongoing dialogue has driven policy decisions
touching upon both liberty and security concerns. Yet despite the enormous effort
that has gone into the national response, the role of the sovereign states, and with
it federalism, has received comparatively little attention. This Article explores the
relevance of federalism within the context of the "War on Terror" and in the after-
math of Hurricane Katrina. Acknowledging that theories of federalism developed
elsewhere are insufficient, he outlines a doctrine of 'emergency federalism.' The au-
thor argues that the Framers consciously retained federalism in times of threat and
conflict analogous to today's challenges. He finds that, relative to the national au-
thority, the scope of states' interests wax and wane depending upon the severity of
the threat and the territorial context, though in no instance are they completely ex-
tinguished. Giuliano shows that this design reflects a judgment, written into the
Constitution, that emergency federalism enhances both security and liberty relative
to a more unilateral approach. He then illustrates how the experience of September
11, the national response since that date, and Hurricane Katrina together indi-
cate that increasing the states' role should, in practice, promote both security and
liberty. Having described emergency federalism and identified its potential advan-
tages, the Article concludes by suggesting possible legal and policy reforms,
including those based on the conclusion that the National Guard is constitution-
ally. unstable as currently constituted.
INTRODUCTION
All catastrophes are local. Even in an age of globalization, the
point of the spear falls upon, and originates from, discrete locales.
Man-made and natural catastrophes ultimately affect individual
people and places. As a consequence, such challenges demand an
appreciation of the small as well as the large scale.'
* Associate, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, New York; J.D., New York University
School of Law; BA., Yale University. My deep gratitude goes to Professors Stephen Holmes,
David Golove, and Rachel Barkow of N.YU for their invaluable comments and guidance. Man),
thanks are also due to the N.Y.U. Center for Law and Security, for illuminating my way through
its outstanding programming and research, and to my brother-in-law, CPT Devon Britton, U.S.
Army, whose personal experience in the War on Terror lent insight and direction with respect
to this topic. Finally, this Article would not have been possible without the love and support of
my spouse, Wendy Liu, and of my family.
1. After this Article's initial drafting but prior to its publication, Hurricane Katrina struck
the Gulf Coast. While this Article primarily addresses emergency federalism in light of terrorism,
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Yet the majority of literature written following the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 concerned the exercise of national power. Even
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which drew attention back
to the role of the states,' the experience of domestic disaster has
again spurred calls to increase federal authority.
4
Recognizing that the relative gap in attention afforded state
governments merits further scrutiny, some commentators have
suggested that federalism should be reconsidered as it relates to
man-made5 and natural disasters. These inquiries have often fol-
the experience of Katrina suggests that this doctrine also provides guidance concerning natural
disasters. Where appropriate, notations discussing this possibility have been added.
2. An informal survey of post-September 11 literature suggests a dominant federal
slant. This approach has been adopted by those generally supportive of the approach to
terrorism thus far. See, e.g., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM (Feb. 2003)
[hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/02/counterterrorism/counterterrorism-strategy.pdf. See generally Robert J. Dela-
hunty & John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations
Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 487 (2002). It is also evident in the writings of those more critical of current efforts.
See, e.g., DAVID COLE &JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY passim (2002); PHILLIP B. HEYMANN,
TERRORISM, FREEDOM & SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR passim (2004).
3. See, e.g., Robert Block & Amy Schatz, Local and Federal Authorities Battle to Control
Disaster Relief, WALL ST.J., Dec. 8, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Block & Schatz, Authorities Battle to
Control] (characterizing the debate over responses to "natural and man-made" disasters as
concerning state versus federal control of recovery efforts).
4. See, e.g., id. (reporting that "[t]he Bush administration says Katrina showed that some
states can't deal with large-scale disasters" and that the head of U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) "told lawmakers that active-duty forces should be given complete authority for
responding to catastrophic disasters").
5. Federalism received some attention immediately after September 11, largely in the
context of how the attacks might alter the doctrine's then-current course. See Linda Green-
house, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at D14; Marci
Hamilton, Federalism and September 11: Why the Tragedy Should Convince Congress to Focus on Truly
National Topics, Oct. 25, 2001, http://writ.findlaw.com/hamilton/20011025.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Greenhouse, Federalism and September 11]; Ernest Young, The Balance
of Federalism in Unbalanced Times: Should the Supreme Court Reconsider Its Federalism Precedents in
Light of the War on Terrorism?, Oct. 10, 2001, http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/
2 0011010_young.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Young, Balance of Federalism].
Thereafter, the issue has emerged again, in the context of how federalism might be applied
given the actual experience since September 11. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of the Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Empowering States When it Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313
(2004);Jill Keblawi, Immigration Arrests by Local Police: Inherent Authority or Inherently Preempted?, 53
CATH. U. L. REV. 817 (2004); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federal-
ism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1277 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Welcome
to the Dark Side]; see also David S. Broder, Shaping Our Defense, WASH. PosT,Jan. 13, 2005, at A21;
Franklin Foer, The Joy of Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, § 7, at 12;James G. Gimpel, Democ-
rats Now Arguefor States'Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 2004, at K12.
6. Federalism has been a central subject of debate following Hurricane Katrina. See,
e.g., Block & Schatz, Authorities Battle to Control supra note 3; Robert Block & Amy Schatz,
Chertoff Promises Revamp of FEMA to Katrina Pane4 WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2005, at A3 [hereinaf-
ter Block & Schatz, Revamp of FEMA] (quoting Florida Governor Jeb Bush as testifying that
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lowed an ends-oriented approach; in other words, federalism
might be useful to get somewhere we already want to go. However,
standing alone, otherwise desirable objectives provide neither the
constitutional nor the practical answer to questions such as why
federalism should matter respecting terrorism in particular. After
all, combating terrorism would appear to be a core function for
the national government.9
For the states to significantly contribute towards fighting a more
effective, more liberty-conscious War on Terror, they must first be
empowered by a constitutional doctrine that explains why federal-
ism applies and how it operates given the particularities of
"[flederalizing emergency response to catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as
Hurricane Katrina"); Robert Block, Brown Portrays a Broken EMA, Faults Local Level WALL
ST. J., Sept. 28, 2005, at A3 (quoting Michael Brown, the head of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) during Katrina, as testifying before Congress that "[if we
break that concept of federalism, we minimize our effectiveness and maximize our potential
for failure").
7. See, e.g., Young, Welcome to the Dark Side, supra note 5, at 1311 ("Federalism is about
dividing power; nothing much depends on what the power in question is being used for");
Foer, supra note 5, at 13 ("[LI iberal federalists would retreat from national politics and focus
on effecting change in their own blue states-passing health care reforms, expanding gay
rights."); Gimpel, supra note 5 ("[L]iberals are embracing state government as a means for
protecting and advancing their political interests."); Richard Thompson Ford, The New Blue
Federalists: The Case for Liberal Federalism, SLATE, Jan. 6, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/
2111942/ (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("[T]he Ameri-
can legal tradition does offer liberals a practical alternative to secession or a condo in
Vancouver. It's called federalism, aka 'state's rights.'").
8. Justice John Paul Stevens' dissenting opinion in Printz v. United States anticipated
this issue. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 940 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[Terrorist threats] may require a national response before federal personnel can be made
available to respond. If the Constitution empowers Congress and the President to make an
appropriate response, is there anything in the Tenth Amendment ... that forbids the
enlistment of state officers to make that response effective?"); see also Young, Welcome to the
Dark Side, supra note 5, at 1291 (citing Justice Steven's dissent in Printz as an example that
"[s]ome critics of the commandeering doctrine have suggested that it may fatally undermine
national anti-terrorism efforts").
9. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 488-89 (describing how "[fioremost among
the objectives committed to [the federal government's] trust is the nation's security"); see
also Ronald McKinnon & Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal Systems: The Role of Political
and Financial Constraints, in THE NEw FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 3, 6-7
(John A. Ferejohn et al. eds., 1997) (discussing defense as a traditional core area of national
concern). The same has also been suggested with respect to large-scale natural disasters. See
Block & Schatz, Authorities Battle to Contro4 supra note 3 (reporting that the head of
NORTHCOM "told lawmakers that active-duty forces should be given complete authority for
responding to catastrophic disasters"); Tim Naftali, Department of Homeland Screw-Up: What is
the Bush Administration Doing, SLATE, Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125494/ (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("In terms of the challenge to
government, there is little difference between a terrorist attack that wounds many people
and renders a significant portion of a city uninhabitable, and the fallout this week from the
failure of one of New Orleans' major levees.").
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terrorism.'0 Speaking more broadly, states' responsibilities and
rights respecting significant domestic crises must be linked to a
kind of "emergency" federalism. Absent such a topical mooring,
today's new, often policy-liberal converts to federalism risk commit-
ting the sin of arbitrariness of which they have previously accused
conservatives." Additionally, providing such a context will allow
states to feel more secure in their constitutional footing, making
them more willing to act accordingly where they might previously
have deferred to federal authority during times of crisis.
The Supreme Court attributes federalism's broad relevance to
the multiplicity of its sources within the Constitution, as "[o] ur sys-
tem of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional
provisions, and not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that
speak to the point explicitly." 2 Proceeding with this in mind, sev-
eral provisions reasonably implicate a distinct state role regarding
certain emergency situations, represented today by the War on
Terror and homeland security.3
The Framers' rationales for extending federalism in troubled
times deserve special consideration as current exigencies appear
analogous to those considered in the drafting. In this way, applying
federalism to homeland security can be justified as an expression
of what the Constitution says and implies on the subject, rather
than as an extension of more general principles developed in a
different context. In particular, proceeding in this manner should
produce tangible benefits in terms of both efficacy and liberty.
Emergency federalism thus encourages a debate about competing
security claims at the state and federal levels, rather than a more
10. This applies equally to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, erup-
tions, and epidemics, which may equal or exceed the destructive impact of a terrorist strike.
11. See, e.g., Editorial, ScrutinizingJohn Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A22 ("The
far right is on a drive to resurrect ancient, and discredited, states' rights theories."); Foer,
supra note 5, at 12 ("For conservatives, 'states' rights' often seems just another way of assert-
ing their libertarianism, their dislike of government in any form".).
12. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923 n.13 (citation omitted).
13. The terms "homeland security" and "homeland defense" are not necessarily inter-
changeable. See, e.g., Courtney Wirwahn, Association of the United States Army, National
Security Watch: Homeland Security and Homeland Defense: Protection from the Inside Out
1-2 (Oct. 2003) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/LWpapers/nsw03_3.pdf; see also Select Bipartisan Comm. to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong., A Failure
of Initiative: The Final Rep. of the Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 39 (2006) [hereinafter Katrina Report]. For the
purpose of this article, the term "homeland security" is used for natural and man-made
threats in the domestic sphere and "national security" or "national defense," as opposed to
homeland defense, is employed for outwardly oriented protective efforts.
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simplistic tradeoff between security and liberty within a single level
of government.
In light of these observations, this Article assesses what the Con-
stitution says and implies on the question of why, and therefore
how, emergency federalism might apply to the War on Terror and
homeland security.
In order to frame the theoretical analysis that follows, Part I re-
views the experience of the states on September 11, in the War on
Terror, and following Hurricane Katrina. It finds recent historical
support for the conclusion that the states can and do matter when
it comes to emergency response.
Part II argues that the Constitution extends federalism to issues
of national security, including emergency situations, with the rela-
tive relationship between the national and state governments
varying depending on the territorial context. The federal govern-
ment takes primary though not exclusive responsibility for
existential threats and manifest conflicts, while the states operate
most prominently with respect to relatively less serious domestic
concerns.
Part III explores how emergency federalism evidences a consti-
tutional judgment that state involvement during times of crisis
serves both efficacy and liberty interests. It posits that such poten-
tial security and liberty gains may be expected when confronting
terrorism in particular.
Having developed a theoretical doctrine of emergency federal-
ism, Part IV addresses how the Constitution provides for this as a
practical expression of state power suitable for implementation.
Part V then applies emergency federalism to terrorism. It finds
that the War on Terror appears to be comprised of two segments, a
war on terrorists and homeland security. While the states contrib-
ute to both efforts, under emergency federalism they potentially
offer greater benefits with regard to homeland security.
Finally, in looking beyond the scope of the current inquiry, Part
VI highlights a few potential areas for practical application of
emergency federalism.
I. THE STATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11
Before entertaining any discussion of the constitutionality of
emergency federalism, we must first ask whether the states offer
practical benefits when it comes to large-scale natural and
man-made disasters. In other words, would it be desirable to
WINTER 2007] 345
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implement this doctrine? The experience of and since September
11 provides a sufficient basis upon which to determine that the
states do, in fact, have much to offer.
A. "This Is Not an Exercise"
FAA: We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York,
and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some
F-16s or something up there, help us out.
NEADS [NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR]: Is this real-world
or exercise?
FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test.
1 4
On September 11, 2001, "It]he air defense of America began
with this call."15 Within minutes, two fighter jets scrambled from
Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts.
16
This initial military response to the worst surprise attack in
modern United States history did not come from the regular
armed forces. 7 Rather, it came from the Air National Guard, "part
of the organized militia of the several States."'8 The National
14. Nat'l Comm. on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report 20 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Report].
15. Id.
16. Id. at 17, 20 and 32; JAMES BAMFORD, A PRETEXT FOR WAR: 9/11, IRAQ, AND THE
ABUSE OF AMERICA'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 10 (2004). It has since been proposed that
Otis be closed, although several state governors have questioned the constitutionality of the
move to close such Air National Guard bases without state consent. See Eric Schmitt, States
Opposing Plan to Shutter Air Guard Bases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, at Al [hereinafter
Schmitt, Air Guard Bases].
17. In addition to the aircraft from Otis, which subsequently patrolled over New York
City, two sets of fighters were scrambled to guard Washington, D.C. The first, airborne at
approximately 9:30 a.m., were regular Air Force units from Langley Air Force Base; these
were ordered into the air through the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD). See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 27. In addition, the Secret Service launched
fighters from the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard just over an
hour later. Id. at 44.
18. 32 U.S.C. § 101 (6) (2000). The National Guard is the modern name for the state
militia. See Selected Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 387 (1918) (noting that, by statute, "the
organized body of militia within the States as trained by the States under the direction of
Congress became known as the National Guard"). See also 32 U.S.C. § 101(3) (2000); 10
U.S.C. § 311 (2000). Unless otherwise indicated, references to the National Guard shall be
to its constitutional role as the states' militia. Consequently, the terms "militia" and "Na-
tional Guard" shall be used interchangeably, with "militia" employed for the institution's




Guard, of which the Air National Guard is part, :1 constitutes the
modern descendant of the state militias.0
On September 11, state and local agencies accounted for the
majority of emergency first responders.1 In New York City, several
thousand uniformed service members arrived at the World Trade
Center before its collapse at 10:28 a.m.;2 2 remarkably, "[w]ell over a
thousand first responders had [already] been deployed" during
the brief seventeen-minute interlude between the first and second
plane strikes.3
Among other resources, on the morning of September 11, New
York City possessed an 1,000-member fire department2 4 and a
40,000-member police department 5 with which it responded to the
attacks.2 6 The state's governor, George Pataki, provided additional
support by mobilizing the New York State National Guard.27 Within
days, 5,000 Guard troops had been provided for the relief effort,
joined by 500 state troopers as well as other state agents.
28
Similarly, "[t]he emergency response at the Pentagon repre-
sented a mix of local, state, and federal jurisdictions .... ."29 Despite
19. The "Air Natonal Guard [is] part of the organized militia of the several States...
active and inactive." 32 U.S.C. § 101(6) (2000). However, the "'Air National Guard of the
United States' is the reserve component of the [regular] Air Force all of whose members are
[simultaneously also] members of the Air National Guard." 32 U.S.C. § 101 (7) (2000) (em-
phasis added). Current broad federal authority over the National Guard stems from the
legal fiction that members of the Guard dual enlist at both the state and federal levels. See 32
U.S.C. 101(5), (7) (2000); see also Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 346 (1990) ("[A]
member of the Guard who is ordered to active duty in the federal service is thereby relieved
of his or her status in the State Guard for the entire period of federal service.").
20. See Selected Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 387; Perpich, 496 U.S. at 346.
21. See generally 9/11 RPoRT, supra note 14, at 278-325.
22. See id. at 278-325.
23. Id. at 293. This constituted "the largest rescue operation in the city's history." Id.
24. Id. at 282.
25. Id.
26. The Fire Department of New York, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Po-
lice Department, and New York Police Department suffered, respectively, 343, 37, and 23
fatalities on September 11. These in turn constituted "the largest loss of life of any emer-
gency response agency in history," as well as the largest and second largest loss of life by any
police department in history. Id. at 311.
27. See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Gov., Governor Pataki Announces Actions
in the Wake of WTC Events (Sept. 11, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform), available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/01/septl 1_1_01.htm.
28. See id.; Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Gov., WTC Response Update: Search
and Rescue Efforts Continue (Sept. 12, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform), available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/01/septl2_Ol.htm; see
also Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Gov., WTC Response Update: Governor Provides
Latest Information on State Response as Rescue and Recovery Efforts Continue (Sept. 14,
2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
www.ny.gov/governor/press/01 /sept4_5_01 .htm.
29. 9/11 REPoRT, supra note 14, at 314.
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its occurrence at the heart of the United States military command,
this effort was coordinated by the Arlington County Fire Depart-
ment.3 0 In retrospect, "the response to the 9/11 terrorist attack on
the Pentagon was mainly a success," in large part, because of the
well-coordinated, interagency, and regional nature of the effort.1
B. "The Guard Will Be Broken"
Four years after September 11, National Guard and Reserve per-
sonnel in active federal service numbered over 137,000. 3  Though
it represents a decline from a peak of 220,000, 33 this figure under-
scored a historic shift towards federal reliance on the Guard and
the Reserves, both in terms of absolute numbers and duration.34
However, unlike in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, these
numbers reflected overseas commitments. For instance, in Sep-
tember 2005 "[m]ore than a third of the 135,000 US troops in Iraq
[were still] National Guard members"; among casualties, "more
than half were either National Guard or military reserve forces.
Overall, "[o]f the estimated 400,000 members of the National
Guard, about 175,000 have been called to active duty to support
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan .... In some instances, these
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. News Release, Office of the Assistant Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. (Public Af-
fairs), National Guard (In Federal Status) and Reserve Mobilized as of December 28, 2005
(Dec. 28, 2005) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaselD=9194.
33. Eric Schmitt & David S. Cloud, Part-Time Forces on Active Duty Decline Steeply, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2005, at Al ("The number of Reserve and National Guard troops on domes-
tic and overseas missions has fallen to about 138,000, down from a peak of nearly 220,000
after the invasion of Iraq two years ago ....").
34. The number of National Guard and Reserve members in active federal duty during
any given month has not fallen below 50,000 since October 2001; it has remained near or
above 100,000, and at times has been above 200,000, since January 2003. See News Releases
Archive, Office of the Assistant Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. (Public Affairs),
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/archive.aspx (providing archives of Department of
Defense news releases organized by year and month; "National Guard (In Federal Status)
and Reserve Mobilized" reports contain data about the number of National Guard mem-
bers) (last visited Nov. 30, 2006); see also Bryan Bender, Demands of Wars Since 9/11 Strain
National Guard's Efforts, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2005, at A30 (arguing that the National
Guard "has [since September 11] been relied upon as never before to conduct overseas
combat missions, contribute to homeland security, and simultaneously fulfill its traditional
obligation of domestic disaster relief").




National Guard units had previously deployed in the immediate
domestic response to September 11.17
In addition to their human cost, these deployments degraded
the National Guard's capacity. In late 2004 the head of the Na-
tional Guard Bureau argued that, unless the Army National Guard
received twenty billion dollars to replace lost or destroyed equip-
ment, "the Guard will be broken and not ready for the next time
it's needed, either here at home or for war." " By July 2005 governors
had begun to charge "that the Iraq war threatens to leave states
unprotected against natural disasters and to make retention more
difficult."39 When faced with the additional issue of Air National
Guard base closures, state officials and representatives "argue [d]
that the plan would leave them vulnerable to terrorist attacks," and
two states even sued.4° In May 2006 a presidential proposal to de-
ploy the Guard on yet another federal mandate, this time along the
41Mexican border, raised similar concerns.
The nationalization of the National Guard was not the only way
in which the federal government sought to increase control over
homeland security.42 For example, other efforts had prompted
37. See, e.g., id. ("The Maryland National Guard's 115th Military Police Battalion, for
example, has been on active duty for more than 24 months since September 2001 and has
been deployed three times, including securing the Pentagon crash site and providing secu-
rity in Iraq," and it has since sent approximately 100 members to Mississippi following
Hurricane Katrina.); Kirk Semple, New York Nerve, Tested on Meanest Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2005, at B1 (documenting how the First Battalion, 69th Infantry, with an armory in Manhat-
tan, "was mobilized after the Sept[ember] 11, 2001, attacks to guard ground zero, West
Point, and the city's bridges, tunnels and subways," and later was committed to a year-long
tour of duty in Iraq).
38. Eric Schmitt, Guard Reports Serious Drop in Enlistment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, at
A32 (quoting Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum (emphasis added)). Along these lines, at least one
news outlet reported that "[t]he National Guard Bureau estimates that its nationwide
equipment availability rate is 35 percent, about half the normal level." Bender, supra note
34.
39. Dan Balz, Guard Deployments Weigh on Governors: Length, Frequency of Tours Worry
States, WASH. POST, July 19, 2005, at A3. These overseas deployments sometimes represent a
double loss for states and cities, as many individual Guard and Reserve members otherwise
serve in local law enforcement or emergency response capacities. See, e.g., Kareem Fahim,
City Police Officer Killed by Sniper in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at B1 ("Among the tens of
thousands of American soldiers serving in Iraq are more than 200 New York police officers
on leave from the city's precincts....").
40. Schmitt, Air Guard Bases, supra note 16.
41. Yochi J. Dreazen & Sarah Lueck, Bush Aims to Quell Infighting with Border Moves,
WALL ST. J., May 16, 2006, at A3 (quoting Sen. Lindsay Graham of South Carolina as stating
that the Mexican border deployment of the Guard "will continue to stress an overstressed
force, and it's not the right skill set for border issues").
42. See OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY (July 2002) [hereinafter HOMELAND SECURITY], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/natLstrat-hls.pdf (detailing a comprehensive approach
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mayors to cite inadequate information sharing and insufficient
funding,43 unfunded mandates," and prioritizations based on the
potential national impact from terrorist attacks, rather than local
effects," asjeopardizing their ability to confront crises.
C. "It's Our Turn to Help Our Own, and We're Not There"
In late August 2005, the eleventh named tropical storm of that
year's Atlantic hurricane season formed; designated Katrina, it
went on to become "the costliest and one of the five deadliest hur-
ricanes to ever strike the United States." 46 The storm effectively
destroyed one of the nation's most populous and historic cities,
New Orleans, and left millions of victims in its wake.47
The near universally criticized response to Katrina, s coming al-
most four years to the day after September 11, "suggested to many
that the nation is not ready to handle a terrorist attack of similar
to homeland security incorporating numerous non-military actors including law enforce-
ment, federal and state governments, and the private sector).
43. See U.S. Homeland Security Effort Irks Mayors, A.P, Jan. 18, 2005 (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
44. See Lori Montgomery, D.C. Pushes to be Paid for Security: Mayor Speaks Out on Inaugu-
ral Costs, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2005, at BI ("D.C. Mayor Anthony A. Williams yesterday
criticized the Bush administration's refusal to reimburse the District for costs related to
tomorrow's inauguration, calling it 'an unfunded mandate' that promises to gobble up cash
needed to prepare the nation's capitalfor a potential terror attack" (emphasis added)) .
45. See Lara Jakes Jordan, Chertoff" States Foot Transit Safety Bill A.P., July 15, 2005 (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (following the July 7, 2005 ter-
rorist attacks on London's mass transit system, comments by Homeland Security Secretary
Michael Chertoff were summarized as stating that, "The [federal] government must focus
on preventing airline hijackings and other terror threats that could inflict mass casualties,
and is limited in the help it can give cities and states to protect trains and buses.").
46. Richard D. Knabb et al., National Hurricane Center, Tropic Cyclone Report Hurri-
cane Katrina 23-30 August 2005, at 1-2 (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://
www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-ALI 22005_Katrina.pdf.
47. By one metric, nearly 1.5 million hurricane victims registered with FEMA. See
Adam Nossiter, Wearying Wait forFederalAid in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at Al.
48. See KATRINA REPORT, supra note 13, at 359 ("The preparation for and response to
Hurricane Katrina should disturb all Americans.... We are left scratching our heads at the
range of inefficiency and ineffectiveness that characterized government behavior right be-
fore and after this storm."). The President himself admitted that mistakes had been made at
all levels of government. Elisabeth Bumiller & Richard W. Stevenson, President Says He's Re-
sponsible in Storm Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at Al; see also Thomas L. Friedman,
Osama and Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A25; Fred Kaplan, $41 Billion, and Not a
Penny of Foresight, SLATE, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125478/ (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Naftali, supra note 9.
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dimensions." '9 In short, Katrina made Cassandras5 ° of those who
had questioned the direction of homeland security.
51
While history will undoubtedly identify many factors that con-
tributed to the inadequate response, the experience of the
National Guard is illuminating for present purposes. When Katrina
struck, approximately forty percent of the Louisiana and Missis-
sippi National Guard were on active duty in Iraq."2 Domestically,
the Guard's equipment was even more depleted, with perhaps a
third available for use.53
Along with the direct effect of the storms on units positioned in
its path, 4 overseas commitments received blame for a lag in the
recovery effort.55 As a Louisiana National Guard captain preparing
to leave Iraq when Katrina hit put it, "It's our turn to help our own,
and we're not there."
56
49. Susan B. Glasser & Josh White, Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top, WASH. POST, Sept.
4, 2005, at Al.
50. "[A] 'Cassandra' tends to describe someone who makes true predictions which are
disbelieved." Wikipedia "Cassandra" Page, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cassandra (last
visited Nov. 30, 2006).
51. Although ultimate responsibility for the failures following Hurricane Katrina re-
main disputed, it is almost universally acknowledged that mistakes were made. In some
cases, Katrina proved eerily correct specific warnings that had previously been made. See,
e.g., KATRINA REPORT, supra note 13, at 81-84 (noting tabletop exercise dubbed "Hurricane
Pam" in many ways predicted Hurricane Katrina); Adam Cohen, If the Big One Hits the Big
Easy, the Good Times May Be Over Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 4, at 12 (reporting that
in a severe hurricane "experts say, [New Orleans] could fill up like a cereal bowl, killing tens
of thousands and laying waste to the city's architectural heritage").
52. Bender, supra note 34.
53. Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, When Storm Hit, National Guard Was Deluged Too, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at Al.
54. Id. (reporting that "[flor a crucial 24 hours after landfall on Aug. 29, [Louisiana
National] Guard officers said, they were preoccupied with protecting their nerve center
from the [storm surge] .... The next morning, they had to evacuate their entire headquar-
ters force of 375 guardsmen by boat and helicopter to the Superdome").
55. See, e.g., id. ("Guard commanders and state and local officials in Louisiana said the
Guard performed well under the circumstances. But they say it was crippled in the early days
by a severe shortage of troops that they blame in part on the deployment to Iraq of 3,200
Louisiana guardsmen."); Eric Lipton et al., Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Lipton, Political Issues] ("'Over the last year, we have
had about 5,000 [National Guard members] out, at one time,' [Louisiana' governor Kath-
leen Blanco] said. 'They are on active duty, serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. That certainly is
a factor.'"); Robert Burns, Guard Deployment in Iraq Hurt Katrina Response General Says, A.P.,
Sept. 9, 2005 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting
that while the head of the National Guard Bureau ultimately believed that "'overseas com-
mitments d[id] not inhibit our ability to sustain [the Katrina response] effort here at home,'
[he also] said that 'arguably' a day at most of response time was lost due to the absence of
the Mississippi National Guard's 155th Infantry Brigade and Louisiana's 256th Infantry Bri-
gade").
56. Michael Moss, Anxiety in Iraq as Guardsmen Head Home to Uncertainties, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4,
2005, § 1, at 26 (quoting from his interview with Captain Terrence R Ryan).
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Certainly arguments have been made from, among others, the
Secretary of Defense,57 the National Guard Bureau," and political
commentators, 59 that deployments did not slow recovery efforts.
Yet the grudging admission by the National Guard Bureau that
Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard deployments "arguably"
delayed the response time by a day,6° the move to speed the re-
turn of troops from Iraq, 6' and the serious consideration of
inserting active-duty troops, 2 not to mention the views of the Lou-
63isiana governor, strongly suggest that deployments either were a
significant factor or came dangerously close to becoming one.
The National Guard was not the only, or even the primary fo-
cus of concern following Katrina. State and local government
came under significant scrutiny for everything from levee man-
agement to law enforcement to the evacuation effort. 4 Federal
decisions also gained considerable attention, from the weakening
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) follow-
ing its incorporation into the Department of Homeland Defense,
to inadequate funding of levee construction. 65
In total, Katrina should be understood as making it clear that,
four years after September 11, national directives at best make it
no easier, and at worst may make it difficult or impossible, for the
states themselves to respond to state and local needs in the event
of a similarly serious catastrophe.
57. Lipton, Political Issues, supra note 55; Burns, supra note 55.
58. Bender, supra note 34.
59. James S. Robbins, Where are the Guardsmen? Right where they ought to be., NAT'L REV.
ONLINE, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/robbins/robbins200509020719.asp (last
visited Nov. 30,2006) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
60. Burns, supra note 55.
61. Moss, supra note 56.
62. The existence of a serious debate amongst senior executive officials over "whether the
president should speed the arrival of active-duty troops by seizing control of the hurricane relief
mission from the governor" by invoking the Insurrection Act supports the fact that available Na-
tional Guard forces were possibly insufficient. Lipton, Political Issues, supra note 55.
63. Id.; see also KATRJNA REPosrr, supra note 13, at 228 ("In Louisiana, Blanco asked for the
immediate return of Louisiana National Guard troops from Iraq, but the National Guard Bureau
was satisfied it could provide sufficient troops from other states to meet the needs of Louisiana
more quickly than trying to extract Louisiana troops from combat operations in Iraq.").
64. See, e.g., Blanco Gets Blame for Katrina Bodies, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Oct. 28, 2005,
at A10; Block, supra note 6; John M. Broder, In Plans to Evacuate US. Cities, Chance for Havoc, N.Y
TiMEs, Sept. 25, 2005, § 1, at 1; Frank Donze, Failure of Levee Merger Spar/a Outrage: Supporters Say
they Won't Let Issue Drmp, TnMEs PICAYUNE, Nov. 22, 2005, at 1; Clifford J. Levy, Political Willfulness:
New Orleans Is not Ready to Think Smal4 orEven Medium, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 11, 2005, § 4, at I;Jennifer
Steinhauer & Eric Upton, fEMA, Slow to the Rescue, Now Stumbles in Aid Effor N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 17,
2005, at Al.
65. See generally Broder, supra note 64; Glasser & White, supra note 49.
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Washington reacted to September 11 by systematically requisi-
tioning state resources and by assuming the mantle of leadership
in the War on Terror. Washington did so to advance present fed-
eral policy needs without due regard to future domestic
requirements. While some state and local officials raised objec-
66tions, in many cases the states willingly yielded to this new order.
This strongly suggests that in confronting the national emergen-
cies, the involvement of the states, which proved their vital
importance on September 11, requires reconsideration and read-
justment by both federal and state actors.67
The story of the National Guard since September 11 illustrates
a central paradox of America's War on Terror. One the one hand,
the effort to combat terrorism has led to a vigorous expansion of
federal authority through legislation,68 departmental reorganiza-ti 69 • • 70
don, appropriations, and executive fiat.7' The very notion of aWar on Terror suggests a unified, national response 72 Yet, though
66. See, e.g., Block & Schatz, Authorities Battle to Control supra note 3 (indicating that Florida
was an exception to the general rule of state acquiescence to federal control of hurricane emer-
gency response); Eric Lipton, New Rulesfor Giving Out AntiternrrAid, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 3, 2006, at Al
[hereinafter Lipton, New Rules forAntiterrorAid] (citing acceptance of Department of Homeland
Security grants by low-population centers in amounts disproportionate to such communities'
perceived risk of terrorist attack).
67. Notably, the Department of Defense agrees on the importance of state and local actors,
having emphasized that "[d]omesfic security is primarily a civilian law enforcement function."
DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT 26 (2005), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d2005630homeland.pdf. See also Bradley Graham,
War Plans Drafted to Counter Terrr Attacks in U.S.: Domestic Effort Is Big Shift for Military, WASH. POST,
Aug. 8, 2005, at Al (reporting that in relation to preparing the "first-ever war plans for guarding
against and responding to terrorist attacks in the United States ... defense officials continue to
stress that they intend for the troops to play largely a supporting role in homeland emergencies,
bolstering police, firefighters and other civilian response groups").
68. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
120 Stat. 192 (2006), and Pub. L. No. 109-178, 120 Star. 278 (2006) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
69. Se, e.g, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(creating the Department of Homeland Security); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (creating the position of Director of National
Intelligence).
70. See, e.g, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FUNDING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 54xx/doc5414/homeland_security.pdf; WHITE HOUSE,
HOMELAND SECURITY BUDGET FACT SHEET (2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pdf/Homeland.pdf (detailing
homeland security funding); WHITE HOUSE, DEFENSE BUDGET FACT SHEET (2006) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pdf/Defense-06.pdf (detailing defense funding).
71. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18,2005, § 1, at 1; THE TORTuRE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen Greenberg et al. eds.,
Cambridge University Press 2005).
72. The Office of Homeland Security (now a cabinet department) has acknowledged
the principle of federalism. See generally HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 42. However, it did
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this massive effort may seek to prevent "another September 11," an
overly dogged federal focus ignores a crucial lesson of Hurricane
Katrina-when it comes to homeland security and emergency re-
sponse, states matter.
Though states matter for numerous reasons, two are the most im-
portant. First, states and their political subdivisions can marshal
significant resources. Second, and more crucially, because federal
'jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves
to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all
other objects,"73 the sovereign states possess distinct, geographically
dispersed, and armed executive power outside of national control.74
II. EMERGENCY FEDERALISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY
As experience demonstrates that the states can make a practical
difference, the next step is to analyze whether, and if so how, the
Constitution provides for such emergency federalism.
A. Congress and the President Generally Enjoy
Broad Control over National Security
The Constitution charges the federal government with the con-
duct of national defense and foreign policy.7 5 Though related,
so in the context of a nationally directed strategy. See id. at vii ("Our structure of overlapping
federal, state, and local governance ... provides unique opportunity and challenges for our
homeland security efforts. .... A national strategy requires a national effort."). Several com-
mentators have likewise expressed a strongly national perspective on the appropriate
response to terrorism. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. LEDEEN, THE WAR AGAINST THE TERROR MAS-
TERS: WHY IT HAPPENED. WHERE WE ARE Now. How WE'LL WIN. (St. Martin's Press 2002);
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2.
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 213 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); see
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) ("It is incontestible that the Constitu-
tion established a system of 'dual sovereignty.'").
74. A current debate concerns reliance upon the "unitary executive" theory by the ad-
ministration of President George W. Bush; the theory provides that the Constitution grants the
President the whole of the executive power, meaning that neither the courts nor Congress can
cabin purely executive actions. See generaly Jess Bravin, Judge Alito's View of the Presidency: Expan-
sive Powers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2006, at Al; Elisabeth Bumiller, For President, Final Say on a Bill
Sometimes Comes After the Signing N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at All; Noah Feldman, Who Can
Check the President, N.Y. TiMEs,Jan. 8, 2006, § 6, at 52. While outside the scope of this Article,
even assuming the correctness of the unitary executive model respecting the federal executive
power, emergency federalism might provide a limited check to the extent that certain execu-
tive authority constitutionally remains with state executives and not the federal executive.
75. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-15 (2003); Perpich v. Dep't of
Def., 496 U.S. 334, 353 (1990) (noting that "several constitutional provisions commit mat-
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these two areas represent different kinds of power, one primarily
martial and the other, largely, persuasive; they may be collectively
categorized as national security powers.
The Constitution contains several provisions regarding the exer-
cise of war powers, euphemistically known today as national
defense.0 The Constitution likewise allocates to the national gov-
17ernment significant foreign relations powers.
To the extent that controversy surrounds these provisions, it
generally relates to separation of powers, rather than the premise
that government of the United States, in its totality, may exercise
such authority.78 Thus, in general there is no external check on the
ters of foreign policy and military affairs to the exclusive control of the National Govern-
ment"); see alsoYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (implying joint authoritative control of the war powers between the Presi-
dent and Congress).
76. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the authority to:
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Cap-
tures on Land and Water; [t]o raise and support Armies ... provide and maintain a
Navy; [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces; [t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; [and t]o provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16. Article II further provides that "[t]he President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.. ." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1; see alsoJohn B. Mitchell, "Preemptive War": Is it Constitutional?, 44 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 497, 499 (2004) (discussing constitutional sources for federal national security powers);
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Pow-
ers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 175-76 (1996) (same).
77. These include Congress's authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
... establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization ... define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," and, through the
Senate, to provide advice and consent regarding the making of treaties and the appoint-
ment of ambassadors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 2-9, 10; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1-2.
The Constitution also provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties [and to] receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 2-3. Additionally, the President enjoys the residual
foreign policy authority inherent in the office's "executive Power" and in the duty to "give to
the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient [and to] take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
78. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
national security, after all, is the primary responsibility and purpose of the Federal Govern-
ment."); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-655 (Jackson, J., concurring) (Justice Jackson's three-
point analysis focuses on the structural allocation of authority between Congress and the
President); see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME passim (1998) (generally adhering to this view); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH?
72 (1981) ("the Constitutional Fathers ... divided authority over war and peace between the
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use of these powers. This arrangement reflects the Framers' desire
to avoid the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation, both as
perceived and as realized.79
During the ratification debate, Federalists lauded the constitu-
tional structure described above.s° Through their vigorous dissent
regarding the ultimate wisdom of this arrangement, the Anti-
federalists confirmed the conclusion that the Constitution indeed
provides the national government with these broad powers. 81
B. Federal Authority over National Security Varies
with the Territorial Context
Though vast, the national government's defense and foreign
policy powers nevertheless wax and wane depending upon the ter-
ritorial context. Specifically, the Constitution qualifies these powers
when applied within the domestic sphere relative to their applica-
tion abroad;82 this carries particular import as experience shows
that the most dramatic and asymmetric threats arise at home.3
President and Congress"); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 488-93; Yoo, supra note 76, at
170-71 n.1-2, 170-73, 188-89; supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the unitary
executive theory).
79. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 945-46 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that the "method of governing [under the Articles of Confederation] proved to be
unacceptable, not because it demeaned the sovereign character of the several States, but
rather because it was cumbersome and inefficient"); see also KEITH L. DOUGHERTY, COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 102-161 (2001); Yoo, supra note 76,
at 256 ("Delegates came to Philadelphia to repair the defects of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, including what they saw as an inability to provide a sufficient defense against
invasion.").
80. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 120-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999) (justifying federal control of national defense and related military powers); THE FED-
ERALIST No. 42, at 232 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("This class of powers
[foreign affairs] forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration.").
81. See, e.g., Brutus, Certain Powers Necessary for the Common Defense, Can and Should be
Limited, reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 57-62 (Morton Borden ed., 1965) (re-
sponding to THE FEDERALIST No, 23 (Alexander Hamilton)). See generally CHARLES A.
LOFGREN, "GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE" CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR,
FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM (1986) (portraying anti-federalist arguments as ac-
cepting the premise that the proposed Constitution greatly expanded national power).
82. Outside the issue of federalism, the Supreme Court has recognized that territorial-
ity can affect the exercise of federal power even when confronting a security threat such as
that posed by international terrorists. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-482 (2004).
83. Though the present Article concerns constitutionally imposed limitations on na-
tional power, it must be noted that statutes also shape how the federal government acts.
Perhaps most famously, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of "any part of the Army
or the Air Force" for domestic law enforcement, subject to some exceptions. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1385 (2000). See also 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2000) (providing for the Secretary of Defense to
promulgate regulations to preclude activities that would otherwise "include or permit direct
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This reflects James Madison's overriding principle that "[if] we are
to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to
other nations.""4 The Constitution ensures that the United States
presents a unified front to the world, without regard to the nature
or imminence of any potential threat;8 5 simultaneously, in order to
safeguard the United States' structure as a "compound republic,"
8 6
the exigencies of presenting a united front externally are domesti-
cally balanced against the states' competing interests and
contributions.
1. Congress and the President Enjoy Greater
Discretion Abroad than at Home
The national government's military powers reach their zenith
when exercised outside the United States. Not only does the Con-
stitution grant the national government, led by a single executive,
the means and ability to raise and maintain a standing army, float a
navy, declare war, enter into treaties, and define "Offenses against
the Law of Nations," but it also expressly forbids the exercise of
87such powers by the states.
An important exception to this scheme occurs in the domestic
context of armed state militias, in which the states retain an•88
interest. In addition, certain liberty-protective limitations on
military power, respecting the writ of habeas corpus"9 and the
stationing of troops inside homes,90 apply only within the domestic
sphere.
participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, sei-
zure, arrest, or other similar [domestic] activity unless participation in such activity by such
member is otherwise authorized by law"). The National Guard is not "part of the Army or
Air Force" for Posse Comitatus purposes. United States v. Hutchings, 127 F.3d 1255, 1257
(10th Cir. 1997).
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 232 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 121-22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("In
the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments .... Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will
be controlled by itself.").
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 10-14; art. I, § 10, cls. 1-2.
88. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1,16; art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. lI, § 10, cl.
3 (a state's limited right to self defense if "actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as
will not admit of delay" implies the use of the militia by the states in the domestic context).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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From an operational perspective, the story remains the same,
with national defense authority being relatively more expansive
and less constrained overseas than at home. Some powers, such as
letters of marque and reprisalV' and the navy,92 have little inherent
domestic relevance. Others, such as the ability to raise armies,93 de-
clare and make war, 94 and repel invasions, 9' though internally
relevant, in practice reach their maximum extent when used
abroad.
Similarly, the national government's authority over relations with
foreign nations differs markedly from the far more complex ar-
rangements amongst the states and between them collectively and
the federal government, 96 as the treaty and foreign relations powers
granted to the federal government are forbidden to the states.
97
The non-conditional endowment of military and foreign rela-
tions powers on the national government when used abroad
maximizes flexibility.98 Debate relating to the proper use of this au-
thority concerns absolute limits on power. It is thus not applicable
to the relative distinctions of federalism.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also Campbell v. Clin-
ton, 203 F.3d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman,J., concurring) ("The Constitution grants
Congress the power to declare war, which is not necessarily the same as the power to deter-
mine whether U.S. forces will fight in a war." (citing The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize
Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863)). Scholars disagree as to the exact difference be-
tween the power to "declare" war and the power to "make" war, a distinction of the relative
power of the Congress and the President. However, agreement exists that the federal gov-
ernment, not the states, enjoys a monopoly on this power except in the case of surprise
attack. Compare Yoo, supra note 76 (arguing for expansive federal executive power), with
LOFGREN, supra note 81, at 3-38 (arguing for shared power amongst the federal branches).
The case of surprise attack constitutes an exception and, thus, an example of residual state
authority within the larger, nationally oriented scheme.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; art. I, § 9, cl. 2; art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
96. Compare Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (holding state legis-
lation regarding a foreign affairs matter preempted by federal action), with Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding federal domestic legislation unconstitutional for
seeking enforcement through commanded state action).
97. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 121 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
("The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is com-
mitted."). The distinction to be made is that, taken together, the President and Congress
hold a virtual monopoly on these powers when directed abroad.
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2. In the Domestic Context, the Balance Between National
and State Authorities Depends upon the Nature of
the Conflict or Threat Faced
In the domestic sphere-the context in which the prior analysis
suggests that the states participate-a distinction must be made
between manifest threats, i.e., actual or impending conflict, and
more generalized threat conditions or potentialities. This is be-
cause the Congress and the President may only wield military force
to combat domestic threats or conflicts contingent upon certain,
albeit ambiguous, constitutional thresholds to which no foreign
counterpart exists.5'
This distinction may be understood by reference to the Republi-
can Guarantee Clause, which provides that "[t]he United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."'
00
This suggests national responsibility for protection against existen-
tial threats, with an existential threat being one likely to extinguish
the state's sovereignty and/or its form of government.'0 ' Notably,
the Constitution qualifies this mandate depending upon the na-
ture and origin of the threat.
The national authority "shall protect each of [the states] against
Invasion. ' ' This represents an absolute compulsion with regard to
the external threats represented by invasions, applicable whether
99. See supra note 83 (noting statutory limits on domestic use of the regular armed
forces).
100. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The language in the clause referencing "Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)" points to the
state, not federal, legislature and executive. Congress appears to recognize this reading. See
10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) ("Whenever there is an insurrections [sic] in any State against its
government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature
cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the
number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary
to suppress the insurrection." (emphasis added)).
101. The Republican Guarantee Clause "has never been enforced by the judiciary be-
cause, ever since Lutherv. Borden in the 1840s, the Supreme Court says that cases under it are
not justiciable." TRANSCRIPT The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism and
Judicial Mandates, Edited Transcripts from the Panel Discussions Held in Phoenix, Arizona on No-
vember 3rd and 4th, 1995, 28 ARiz. ST. L.J. 17, 29-30 (1996) (quoting Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)) [hereinafter Chemerinsky
Transcript]; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222-23 (1962). For present purposes the
clause is important because of what it implies about the relationship between state and fed-
eral governments during times of crises.
102. U.S. CONS-T. art. IV, § 4.
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one is imminent or merely possible. This broad mandate, cou-
pled with the federal government's open-ended national security
powers,104 makes nearly any national action aimed at invasions, real
or reasonably imagined, arguably constitutional.
By contrast, "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect
each of them ... on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."
10 5
Even though the threat may be equivalent to an invasion, the
Framers here believed that the domestic context was sufficiently
distinct to require some limitation on national action.
At the time of the Constitution's drafting, many feared that the
national government's powers might be misappropriated, thus risk-
ing the states' republican form of government.' Therefore, while
the national interest in preservation may be paramount when fac-
ing an external threat, the Constitution conditions the federal
response to even the gravest "domestic Violence" upon the consid-
eration of the citizenry of the state in question."7
Other provisions similarly suggest respect for federalism during
domestic emergencies. Though the Constitution does not define
war,100 it does envision conflict, broadly speaking, taking place
within the United States. The Constitution's approach to these
situations can be divided into two general categories, those of inva-
sion and of domestic unrest. As previously suggested, the first
implicitly originates abroad, while the second derives from within.
Coupled with the extensive, open-ended federal military and
foreign relations powers, the Republican Guarantee Clause might
be taken to suggest that, in cases of invasion, the national authority
acts without domestic constraint. This is not, strictly speaking, cor-
103. Note that at the time of the Constitution's framing, given the size and level of de-
velopment of the former Colonies relative to potential adversaries and the knife's edge
experience of the Revolution, an invasion would almost invariably have presented an exis-
tential threat. This understanding of invasions generally comports with the function of the
Republican Guarantee Clause.
104. See supra Part II.A.
105. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added); see also 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (adher-
ing to this scheme in the event of "an insurrections [sic] in any State against its
government").
106. See LOFGREN, supra note 81, at 44.
107. Read literally, the Republican Guarantee Clause requires that either the state's leg-
islature or governor be in power, thus arguably allowing the national government to
intervene if domestic violence has already overthrown a state's republican government,
having made it impossible for either the governor or the legislature to act.
108. See HEYMAN, supra note 2, at 19 ("Surprisingly, the term 'war' is without real defini-
tion in either the law of the United States or the law of nations.").
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rect. Within the domestic sphere, the Constitution places several
liberty-enhancing limitations that operate even in the case of an ac-
tual invasion.'0 9
For instance, Congress must "provide for calling forth the Militia
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions"-thus necessity itself in the form of an invasion or in-
surrection does not federalize the militia."" Similarly, neither the
writ of habeas corpus nor the prohibition on soldiers being stationed
in private homes becomes suspended by the event of an invasion."'
The comparison of the Constitution's approach to conflict in
the foreign and domestic spheres may appear an exercise in aca-
demic technicalities. The United States does and should retain
broad authority to provide for the national defense, exclusive of
state interference. The outlines of this scheme, which favor na-
tional power in many situations, have long enjoyed support;
notably, " [t] he explicit restrictions on state war-making in the Con-
stitution received almost no attention, adverse or otherwise, in the
state [ratification] debates." 2 Instead, the crucial distinction re-
flects the relative divergence between the constitutional exercise of
national security authority within the United States as compared to
outside its borders.
3
109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (the militia is not automatically called forth in
times of invasion but only upon provision of Congress); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (the writ
of habeas corpus is not automatically suspended in times of invasion but only as required);
U.S. CONST. amend. II (the state militias retain the independent right to bear arms at all
times); U.S. CONST. amend. III (war, including necessarily an invasion, does not automati-
cally allow for troops to be stationed in private homes, as such may only occur by operation
of law).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
111. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. III. See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("Our Federal Constitution contains a provi-
sion explicitly permitting suspension [of the writ of habeas corpus], but limiting the situations
in which it may be invoked .... Although this provision does not state that suspension must
be effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so understood, consistent with
English practice and the Clause's placement in Article I.").
112. LOFGREN, supra note 81, at 17.
113. The United States' borders may not necessarily be the proper legal boundary in a
particular matter related to terrorism or national security. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 475-85 (2004). Though their exact parameters may be difficult to map out, for present
purposes the important point is that the Constitution largely distinguishes between domestic
and foreign spheres.
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C. States Perform National Security Functions
in Relation to the Territorial Context
1. States Supplement National Power
The Framers incorporated limited but significant state roles re-
garding national defense and homeland security. These
accommodations, which resulted from widespread concern that
unchecked national power would lead to inefficiencies and, at
worst, risk tyranny," 4 stand out in part because in some cases they
appear alongside absolute prohibitions on state action in similar
situations.
The Constitution unequivocally states that "[n]o State shall en-
ter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; ...
or grant any Title of Nobility."" This provision contrasts with the
clause following it:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."6
This second clause represents a unique divergence from the
general scheme allocating national defense to the federal govern-
ment, particularly in the context of domestic emergencies. As at
least one scholar has noted, "this is the only explicit reference to
[surprise attack] in either the completed Constitution or the ear-
lier drafts.""' Given the mortal danger inherent in a surprise
attack, especially at the time of the Philadelphia Convention, the
Framers pragmatically "felt it necessary to explicitly grant emer-
114. See LOFGREN, supra note 81, at 44 (finding that with respect to liberty "the Antifed-
eralists ... portrayed the Constitution's allowance of a peacetime standing army as an
opening for tyranny"); id. at 16 (noting that, respecting the provision of an efficient defense,
the Constitution was written at a time "when communications and transportation would not
have allowed an immediate federal response to a truly surprise attack ... the real problem
would have been whether states might act prior to a national decision").
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cI. 1.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
117. LOFGREN, supra note 81, at 15; seealsoREvELEY, supra note 78, at40 ("The states, of
course, are the beneficiaries of the Constitution's only explicit indication that a need for
speed mayjustify combat unauthorized by Congress.").
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gency military powers to the states rather than to the national ex-
ecutive, probably on the assumption that state militia would bear
the first brunt of repelling sudden attack.""" As a consequence, the
states possess constitutionally delegated emergency powers.
Beyond their position as emergency first responders, Article I,
section 10, clause 3 also hints at a broader role for the states as
permissible instruments of national defense. Restating the proposi-
tion in affirmative language, given Congressional consent, states
may "lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time
of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War," and they may also
independently "engage in War ... [when] actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."" 9
Comparison with Article I, Section 10, clause 1 illuminates the
matter since it provides a total ban, even though the prohibited
powers might also have been, from Congress's point of view, useful
tasks for states to perform at its direction.'"0 The difference is that
conditionally-permitted state actions go directly towards effective
national defense, whereas those absolutely prohibited are of a
more general character touching upon the presentation of a
united front to the world.
2. In the Domestic Context, State Authority Respecting
National Security Depends upon the Nature of
the Conflict or Threat Faced
The conditional approach to state action present in section 10,
clause 3 of Article I provides two insights.
First, the Constitution limits state action to something akin to
self-defense, which is by definition self-focused and thus domestic.
Second, the prohibition lifts for two categories of emergencies, ei-
ther when "actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will
not admit of delay." 21 Critically, it speaks of "imminent Danger,"
not imminent invasion. It thus suggests that the states may respond
to crises other than extraterritorial invasions that occur within their
118. REVELEY, supra note 78, at 60. While much has changed in the over two hundred
years since ratification, it is worth noting as related at the outset that the Air National Guard
provided the first military response to the attacks of September 11. See supra Part I.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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borders. This difference implies a distinction between foreign and
domestic threats.
In the first instance, state responses to external dangers are se-
verely limited to those cases where foreign troops have already
occupied state territory, as in the case of an actual invasion. In
other words, the states' independent role in externally-oriented
defense is limited to situations of actual conflict. This makes sense
in light of the United States' absolute responsibility to "protect
each of [the states] against Invasion.""2 It also represents a rational
principle of self-help where reliance on the alternative, national
forms of defense might be untenable.
In contrast, the states may themselves respond to "imminent
Danger."12 3 This most properly encompasses domestic unrest, those
actual domestic conflicts other than invasions, as well as imminent
threats of such hostilities. Taking the Republican Guarantee
Clause, together with the "imminent Danger" language in Article I,
section 10, the Constitution here defines a discrete role for states
in confronting grave domestic conflicts or threats.
In the breach, the states comprise legitimate emergency first re-
sponders. The national government might underestimate domestic
unrest,2 4 or lack the capacity to respond given a posturing of re-
sources to meet the paramount concern of foreign invasion or
attack. 25 Therefore, the Constitution's allowance for the states to
respond independently to surprise attack makes it more likely that
at least some sovereign force shall be both empowered and atten-
tive in all eventualities. 126 Moreover, the qualifications on federal
122. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The President's Oath of Office interestingly contains the
only other occurrence of the word "protect" found in the Constitution outside the Republi-
can Guarantee Clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 ("'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will... preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'" (emphasis added)).
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
124. Domestic threats (as distinct from conflicts) may be inherently harder to gauge for
two reasons. First, the liberty-protective goal of the federal system and the Bill of Rights
counsels respect for domestic criticism of established and majority interests, thus making it
difficult to sort permissible from seditious threats (again, conflicts are more clear-cut). Sec-
ond, foreign threats are, by nature, more suspect than domestic threats due to the lack of
domestic ties and allegiances, as well as the relatively greater difficulty of gathering clarifying
information regarding them.
125. For example, reflecting Cold War influences, on September 11, 2001, large por-
tions of the United States arsenal, including stealth bombers, nuclear missiles, submarines,
overseas military bases, and heavy (tank) divisions were irrelevant in kind and location to the
problem at hand-hijacked civilian aircraft domestically employed as missiles against urban
targets.
126. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states filled a similar role, though for dif-
ferent reasons. See DOUGHERTY, supra note 79, at 105 ("[During Shays' Rebellion] [s]tate
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authority within the United States serve to limit the potential for
abuse. In this sense, the Republican Guarantee Clause's legislative
action requirement provides a rough test that the danger is in
some sense "real." It does so by requiring, outside the more clear-
cut situation of an invasion, that a separate and sovereign state
government pre-approve armed federal intervention within its ter-
ritory.
Limits on the federal authority to call up the state militias con-
tained in the Militia Clauses, 12 7 though now stretched to the point
of possible unconstitutionality,2 8 support the interpretation above.
As a default, these limits should leave the militias at the states' dis-
posal for confronting either internal threats or actual conflict.
2 9
D. Emergency Federalism Distinguishes Existential
and Non-Existential Threats
Through its assignment of security responsibilities along a con-
tinuum, the Constitution evidences an awareness of potential
differences both between foreign and domestic spheres, as well as
between perceived threats and actual conflicts. With respect to
manifest conflicts, the federal government takes a leading role
while the states retain certain distinct responsibilities. At the other
extreme, the states regulate matters of non-national concern.30
These two poles might be understood as embodying total war
and total peace. Potential domestic threats exist somewhere in be-
tween. Here the Constitution envisions the federal government
and the states as co-equal actors. In other words, the states carry
out pre-conflict homeland security on behalf of a country that col-
lectively concerns itself with broader issues of national, externally
oriented defense and foreign policy.
militias allowed Massachusetts and New York to pursue the insurgents according to local
interests, when it was clear that the union would not come to their aid.").
127. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16.
128. See supra Part VI.A (critiquing the modern "dual enlistment" system in light of the
post-September 11 experience).
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; see also infra Part IV.
130. While the regulatory power of the federal government has vastly expanded over
the past century, under the Constitution the states nonetheless retain their roles as the level
of government properly oriented towards "everyday" issues ranging from law enforcement to
public education.
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1. The Constitution Envisions Primary Federal Responsibility
for Existential Threats and Conflicts
Those conflicts and threats previously shown to be considered of
national importance, such as war, invasion, or rebellion,'1 share a
common trait: on their face they pose potentially existential chal-
lenges. This emphasis on national power reflects a conscious
design principle.3 2 In arguing that "[t]he authorities essential to
the common defense ... ought to exist without limitation," Alex-
ander Hamilton employed the language of existential threat,
noting that "t]he circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are
infinite."33 Though federal authority may engage the world in a
variety of ways well short of life-and-death struggles, federal power
was designed to allow sufficient flexibility and muscle to address
existential threats, including actual conflicts.
At home, the Framers also provided the federal government
with primacy for ensuring the continuity of republican govern-
ment.' 3 While the Republican Guarantee Clause may not have
proven to be greatly important in practice, 3 5 its orientation, along
with other elements of the Constitution's emergency framework,
suggests a degree of national responsibility for those threats that




2. States Supplement National Responses to Existential
Threats, While Maintaining Primary Responsibility
for Less Fundamental Domestic Concerns
In times of emergency, the Constitution envisions a discrete,
though important, role for the states. When no crisis exists, the
states operate as the primary caretakers of domestic peace. The
131. See supra Part II.A-B.
132. See generally LOFGREN, supra note 81, at 3-38; DOUGHERTY, supra note 79.
133. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 121 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(emphasis added).
134. U.S. CONST. art. TV, § 4; see DOUGHERTY, supra note 79, at 167 ("The new constitu-
tion would improve the defense of the nation and thereby protect state independence. Without
an effective general government, the states might be overrun by foreign invaders and lose
their sovereignty entirely. 'New York's existence as a state,' wrote [Robert] Livingston [during the
ratification debate in New York], 'depends upon a strong and efficient government.'" (em-
phasis added)).
135. See Chemerinsky Transcript, supra note 101, at 29-30.
136. See generally Part II.B.2.
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states' orientation with regard to homeland security reflects the
inverse of the federal position: one expands as the other contracts.
The Framers justified national primacy over the military and
foreign affairs upon necessity grounds. During the ratification de-
bates, John Jay tied support for federal authority as the best means
to ensure public safety to an existential definition of safety "as it
respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquility, as
well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dan-
gers of the like kind arising from domestic causes.,131
Nevertheless, the Constitution provides that the states may con-
front even the most serious threats.3 8 Provisions related to the writ
of habeas corpus39 and stationing troops inside homes,' 40 as well as
limitations on the federal ability to marshal the militia, 14 state ap-
pointment of militia officers,'
4 2 and the Second Amendment,
43
provide either conditional or absolute limits on federal power. In
total, these allowances evidence an extension of federalism to the
most troubled of times.
Besides maintaining the militia and serving as a potential first
line of defense against surprise attack, at least two other aspects of
the constitutional scheme envision state involvement during times
of existential threat. First, Congress may authorize the states to
provide military assistance beyond the militia system in the form of
state "Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace."'" Thus, Congress
may employ state military forces as a deterrent to potential exter-
nal threats (i.e., "in time of Peace") that would otherwise fall within
the exclusive purview of the federal government.
Second, any person charged with treason, the ultimate crime
against the nation, 45 "who shall flee from Justice, and be found in
another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the
137. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 10 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). At the time,
"foreign arms and influence" posed a very real threat to the nation's existence. Thus, by
tying the definition of domestic security concerns to these foreign threats, Jay defined both
in existential terms.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. See generally supra Part II.C.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
142. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added). Since the states always retain the
right to maintain a militia, the reference here to troops and naval ships equates to regular
forces of the kind otherwise reserved to the national authority.
145. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (Treason consists "only in levying War against [the
United States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.").
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State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
having Jurisdiction of the Crime."
1 46
The states, of course, also retain general police powers over a
host of crimes beyond treason.47 In keeping with this principle,
emergency federalism provides that the states serve as the primary
guarantors of domestic peace and security in most times and
against most non-existential threats. While the federal power may
appear vast, it nonetheless remains bound by the Constitution.
Outside of war, invasion, or insurrection, violence and threats of a
more limited, dispersed, and/or individualized nature exist. The
constitutional structure puts the states at the forefront of confront-
ing such challenges.
III. PROMOTING SECURITY AND PROTECTING
LIBERTY THROUGH FEDERALISM
Having observed that the Constitution adheres to federalism
even on national and homeland security matters, a motivating ra-
tionale must be sought to explain why the Framers' extended the
doctrine into this realm.
Two primary forces emerge that explain the Constitution's em-
brace of emergency federalism-security and liberty. The Framers
understood that the states could promote both liberty and efficacy
interests, thereby protecting basic rights while also furthering the
nation's security. These theoretical, systemic advantages were in-
corporated into the Constitution because of analogous challenges
present in the late Eighteenth Century.
Since September 11, many have grappled with a problem com-
mon to times of war: how to ensure that the United States enjoys
both liberty and security.148 Thus, the Framers' design remains par-
ticularly relevant today.
146. U.S. CONST. art. rV, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see also supra Part IV.B. (providing
a fuller discussion of treason and the Extradition Clause).
147. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000) (holding that because the
federal government is one of limited powers, "[t]he regulation and punishment of intrastate
violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in inter-
state commerce has always been the province of the States" (citing United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995))).
148. See, e.g., HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 42, at 48 ("We are a Nation built on the
rule of law, and we will utilize our laws to win the war on terrorism while always protecting
our civil liberties.... Where we find our existing laws to be inadequate in light of the terror-
ist threat, we should craft new laws carefully, never losing sight of our strategic purpose for
waging this war-to provide security and liberty to our people."); David Cole, The Priority of
Morality: The Emergency Constitutions Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1760 (2004) (noting
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A. Emergency Federalism Promotes Security
Political and legal theorists have advanced a number of hypothe-
ses regarding the potential efficiency benefits to be derived from
federalism. 49 It has been suggested that "the public finance and
the public choice perspectives ... [offer] persuasive arguments
suggesting that federalism, if prperly designed, offers substantial ad-
vantages over unitary governments. '"'5 The explanation for such a
result flows from "[el conomic theory[,] [which] suggests that the
appropriate level of government to provide a given public good
critically depends on the degree of spatial nonrivalry of that
good."
1 1
Of course, the Framers lacked access to modern theories that
explain how federalism might advance important efficiency inter-
ests. However, this does not mean that they lacked their own
conception of how the Constitution's framework could provide a
more efficient and security-enhancing system of government.
The Framers drafted the Constitution to address infirmities ob-
served under the Articles of Confederation. 15 These were
identified with the Confederation's manifest inefficiencies:
The truth is that the great principles of the Constitution pro-
posed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely
new than as the expansion of principles which are found in
modern terrorism "dramatically raised the bar for the scale of carnage that terrorists are
willing to inflict [which] pose[s] a real threat[] to our security and in turn to our liberty");
Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 457, 484 (2002)
("The true values here are liberty, privacy, the rule of law, and safety."). See generally WILLIAM
H. REHNQUIST, supra note 78 (providing a historical overview of the tension between liberty
and security concerns during times of war).
149. E.g., WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM passim (1972) (expanding on public
choice theory); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. EcoN. 416,
418 (1956) (providing a classic formulation of the advantages of sorting, whereby "[t]he
consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference
pattern for public goods ... [thus] [tihe greater the number of communities and the
greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his
preference position"); see also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1549-50 (1994); Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 4 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal
Republic, 89J. POL. ECON. 152, 154-57 (1981).
150. McKinnon & Nechyba, supra note 9, at 47. See also Tiebout, supra note 149, at 418
(providing theoretical support for this conclusion). Some have argued that particular appli-
cations of federalism might also lead to inefficient results and diminished safety. See, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 940-41 (1997) (StevensJ., dissenting); Craig M. Brad-
ley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 601-02 (2004).
151. McKinnon & Nechyba, supra note 9, at 6.
152. SeegenerallyDOUGHERTY, supra note 79, at 129-61.
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the Articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the lat-
ter system has been that these principles are so feeble and
confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have
been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement
which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire trans-
formation of the old.
53
Perhaps more than any of his contemporaries, Alexander Hamil-
ton argued that sweeping national powers were necessary in order
to provide for the common defense "[b]ecause it is impossible to
foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies,
and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may
be necessary to satisfy them.""4 Any other arrangement would be
less efficient and potentially fatal to the young republic. The spe-
cific powers actually granted to the national government represent
the practical implementation of the Federalists' vision.
When they felt it was necessary for the nation's security, the
Framers knew how to delegate authority not subject to state limita-
tions.1 55 After all, "[o]ne of the major reasons for the Constitution,
claimed the Federalists, was the Confederation's inability to raise
armies; surely, therefore, the Federalists did not intend to deny this
power to the new government. '"' 56
By the same token, the Framers' inclusion of the states within
the larger sphere of the common defense 57 evidences a conscious
judgment that the provision of security turns upon the context.
The inclusion of the Militia Clauses 58 bears on this point, as it bal-
ances Hamilton's national exigencies with "the concern that the
states' local needs for the militia would be unmet if the militia was
often in federal service." 59 The Constitution's respect for state au-
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 219 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
154. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 121 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(emphasis in original omitted).
155. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (providing for a standing army). State inter-
ests were of course still expressed indirectl)y for example through the state selection of
Senators and the Electoral College. See also LOFGREN, supra note 81, at 14 (noting that, dur-
ing the Constitutional Convention, "limitations [on the ability of the states to independently
engage in war,] even stricter than those which had been included in the Articles [of Con-
federation,] emerged during the deliberations of the Committee on Detail" (citations
omitted)); id. at 17 (noting that these "explicit restrictions on state war-making in the Con-
stitution received almost no attention, adverse or otherwise, in the state debates").
156. LOFGREN, supra note 81, at 46.
157. SeesupraPartIl.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16.
159. Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56 U. CIN.
L. Rev. 919, 927 (1988); see also id. at 959 ("The militia clauses were designed to give the
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thority safeguarded the miltias' position as emergency first re-
sponders, in times of either local or national need.
The security and efficiency concerns evident in the Constitu-
tion's adherence to federalism extend to coordination on issues of
national concern. Alexander Hamilton anticipated the arrange-
ment of states as sovereign instruments applied towards certain
shared national objectives:
[T] he laws of the Confederacy as to the enumerated and legiti-
mate objects of itsjurisdiction will become the SUPREME LAW
of the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative,
executive, and judicial in each State will be bound by the
sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magis-
trates, of the respective members will be incorporated into the
operations of the national government as far as its just and con-
stitutional authority extends-, and will be rendered auxiliary to
the enforcement of its laws.'
As shown here, even an arch-Federalist such as Hamilton recog-
nized that, at some level, the Constitution incorporated limits on
the ability of the federal authority to incorporate the states "into
the operations of the national government."
Even assuming the Framers were in fact motivated by an effi-
ciency rationale, the realities of the Twenty-First Century might
make federalism a less useful doctrine. For instance, modern pub-
lic goods theory holds that " [t] he national nonrivalry embodied in
national public goods ... gives rise to large cost advantages to cen-
tral governments.""" National defense generally, or something like
a nuclear shield specifically, constitutes the prototypical public
good for provision at the national level. 6
Emergency federalism deals with a broader range of public
goods than those that exclusively fall within the national sphere.
With respect to defense provisions, the Framers acted in part based
upon the failures observed during Shays' Rebellion. 63 At that time,
"[a]ll states gained public, nonexcludable benefits from the sup-
pression of Shays' Rebellion ... But only Virginia and the New
federal government access to the citizen army in emergencies while leaving the states with
their own militias at all other times.").
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
161. McKinnon & Nechyba, supra note 9, at 7 (emphasis in original omitted).
162. Id.
163. See generally DOUGHERTY, supra note 79, at 103-61 (discussing Shay's rebellion).
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England states received the private, excludable benefits needed to
encourage contributions. ", 64 While they may have been unable to
articulate the problem in such modern terms, the Framers under-
stood the issue and acted accordingly, for example by creating a
national monopoly on war making.65
Yet the Framers also recognized that not all conflicts or threats
present the same set of issues, the same mix of costs and benefits,
as an armed rebellion.1 56 A localized, non-specific domestic threat
might challenge a state first and foremost. By contrast, a large-scale
invasion or rebellion demands relatively greater and more imme-
diate national attention, though not to the exclusion of the state in
which it takes place. Thus, emergency federalism derives from the
observation, made in the context of different but analogous chal-
lenges observed over two centuries ago, that the common defense
may best be served by applying the relative strengths of both state
and federal authorities.
B. Emergency Federalism Serves Important Liberty Interests
The Constitution was "built on the assumption that liberty [is]
best secured through a rigorous commitment to federalism and
separation of powers." 7 It protects liberty both directly, through
the Bill of Rights, and indirectly, through the institutional structure
of government itself. According to one commentator, these "two
approaches-the institutional one and the one promoting individ-
ual rights-are profoundly distinct [therefore] the foundation of
the institutional approach derives from an acknowledgment of the
autonomy of supraindividual bodies [i.e., states] within any well-
conceived constitutional theory."'8 Under this construction, "an
institutional or group-oriented approach [i.e., federalism] is a nec-
essary complement to the individual-rights-oriented approach to
protecting individuals."'' 69 The Supreme Court likewise recognizes
164. Id. at 106.
165. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
166. Shays' Rebellion presented a grave threat to the young nation; lasting several
months, it included an attempted assault on the national arsenal in Springfield, Massachu-
setts. See DOUGHERTY, supra note 79, at 103-04.
167. Young, supra note 5, at 1284.
168. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federal-




that "[t]his separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitu-
tion's structural protections of liberty.',
70
The idea that federalism might promote civil liberties in a mean-
ingful way may appear anathema to some, in particular "[t] o many
liberals, [because] 'states' rights' is almost synonymous with the old
South and Jim Crow."'7 Yet, as the War on Terror illustrates, na-
tional policies can also give rise to serious civil rights concerns.172
This should not suggest a blind embrace of federalism. Rather, it
recommends balance, as "the autonomy of the states and the idea
of limited national power are no less important bulwarks of indi-
vidual liberty than the more familiar provisions of the Bill of
Rights." 73 Neither liberty-protective mechanism-the doctrine of
federalism or the Bill of Rights-should be dismissed out of hand.
During the ratification debates, the Framers championed feder-
alism as an institutionalized, liberty-enhancing system. James
Madison assured contemporaries that as "the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments .... The different governments will con-
trol each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
170. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 598, 921 (1997).
171. Ford, supra note 7; see also, Foer, supra note 5, at 13; Editorial, ScrutinizingJohn Rob-
erts, upra note 11.
172. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) ("We have long since made clear
that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nation's citizens." (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587
(1952))); DouglasJehl, Questions Left by C.LA. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005,
atAl ("[T]he director of central intelligence ... could not assure Congress that the Central
Intelligence Agency's methods of interrogating terrorism suspects since Sept. 11, 2001, had
been permissible under federal laws prohibiting torture."); Man Convicted in Millennium
Bomb Plot Is Sentenced, WASH. POST, July 28, 2005, at A15 (during sentencing for the "Millen-
nium Bomb Plot," U.S. District Judge John C. Coughenour criticized tactics employed in the
War on Terror by arguing that the United States does "not need to use a secret military tri-
bunal, detain the defendant indefinitely or deny the defendant the right to counsel");
Sanger, supra note 71 (reporting that the President had atthorized the National Security
Agency to wiretap telephone conversations without court warrants). But see Gary Fields &
Anne Marie Squeo, Bipartisan Fix for Patriot Act Takes Shape: Both Parties in Congress Share Mis-
givings About Provisions on Libraries, Searches, Wiretaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2005, at A4 (noting
bipartisan political support for the renewal of the Patriot Act, with civil liberty concerns
limited to a few of the Act's provisions); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Venneule, Judicial Cliches on
7rrorism, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2005, at A15 (critiquing the "sentiment that yesterday's law
enforcement procedures are adequate for today's security threats--and that any deviation
from them is a betrayal of the Constitution"); Michael Scheuer, A Fine Rendition, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2005, at A23 (supporting the rendition program).
173. Young, Balance of Federalism, supra note 5.
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itself."174 In other words, the Constitution embodies the principle
that " [ s] ometimes it takes a government to check a government.",
6
The Framers extended federalism as a means to promote liberty
by countering the risk of tyranny."76 Federalism can advance state
and individual liberty in a variety of ways. 177 However, the crucial
observation is that modern federalism, developed in other con-
texts, receives independent justification in the specific context of
armed conflict or threat most closely related to terrorism. This
conclusion responds to the critique that, because modern federal-
ism developed in a vastly different context, the doctrine "may
fatally undermine national anti-terrorism efforts." 78 It does so by
suggesting that the Framers specifically took this concern into ac-
count for situations analogous to terrorism and nevertheless
concluded that the proper balance includes states as co-guarantors
of liberty.
IV. EMERGENCY FEDERALISM AS A PRACTICAL DOCTRINE
Having devised a distinct role for the states that promotes im-
portant security and liberty interests, the Constitution provides the
states with the necessary power to serve those interests in a mean-
ingful capacity. The Constitution's adherence to federalism is not
superficial. Rather, it is intended to be carried out in practice, and
thus remains relevant with regard to homeland security and emer-
gency response.
174. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
175. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side, supra note 5, at 1285.
176. See Rapaczynski, supra note 168, at 381 ("[T]he Framers did not believe that a bill
of rights was a sufficient guarantee against the danger of 'tyranny,' and they insisted in the
first place on institutional rather than individual-ights-oriented solutions. Some of these
institutional arrangements were quite specific ... but most had a more general purpose of
fragmenting governmental authority and of creating special interest groups. In this category,
next to separation of powers, federalism plays the most important role.").
177. See Kramer, supra note 149, at 1485 ("There are, for example, huge literatures on
how-depending on one's take-federalism either ... protects individual liberty or encour-
ages tyranny."); Young, Welcome to the Dark Side, supra note 5, at 1286-87 (arguing that, given
the volume of academic writing on federalism, the opposite conclusion-that Federalism
can retard liberty-also receives support). For present purposes, the crucial observation is
that the Constitution supports federalism as a means for promoting liberty in emergency
situations. See infra Part VI.C (positing at least one way in which this doctrine can actually be
implemented so as to achieve liberty benefits).
178. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side, supra note 5, at 1291; see also Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 940 (1997) (StevensJ., dissenting).
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A. The Constitution Grants the States Significant Martial Powers
Even those Federalist Framers who supported a standing army
admitted that "[t]he militia would be useful against foreign foes
and in supporting the federal government in its domestic func-
tions."1 79 From a constitutional standpoint, state militias serve a
dual purpose. On the one hand, by default the militias remain
creatures of the state under the authority of the governor. "° On the
other, the United States can call forth the militia knowing that it
will already be trained in accordance with basic federal standards.
8'
Seeking to allay Anti-federalist fears that this balance risked too
much national control, Alexander Hamilton argued: "The Presi-
dent will have only the occasional command of such part of the
militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into
the actual service of the Union.... [T]herefore, the power of the
President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the gover-
nor."182 Regardless of whether Hamilton correctly characterized the
exact counterpoise of this balance, his basic point remains undeni-
able: the Constitution envisions the militia as a significant
instrument of state power, with a secondary federal role.
Absent compelling national necessity, 83 the militias should be
available for use by the states. As George Nicholas argued during
the Virginia ratification convention, "[t]here is a great difference
between having the power in [these] three cases, and in all cases.
[Congress] can not call [the state militias] forth for any other pur-
pose than to execute the laws, suppress insurrections and repel
invasions.'08 4 Further support for this conclusion comes from the
amendment during the Philadelphia Convention of thePresident's
commander-in-chief power to limit authority over the "Militia of
179. LOFGREN, supra note 81, at 44 (noting that the Anti-Federalists "regarded the mili-
tia [alone] as a reliable line of defense in peacetime"). The states sought to tweak the militia
system and thus its utility by offering amendments to the proposed Constitution; of the sev-
enty-five amendments offered by five of the eleven states that ratified the Constitution
before the federal government began operation, "six [dealt] with the raising and mainte-
nance of anries and control of the militia (i.e., the war-supportingfinction)." Id. at 16.
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16. The limited power of Congress to call forth the
militia necessarily implicates its baseline embodiment as an entity of the state. See id.
181. Id.
182. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 385 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(emphasis added) (comparing the proposed Presidential power to the power of Great Brit-
ain's king and New York's governor).
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
184. Hirsch, supra note 159, at 930.
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the several states" to times "when called into the actual Service of
the United States."
185
To the extent that today the National Guard may be called into
federal service for purposes beyond those set forth in the Constitu-
tion, this results largely from the peculiarities of the "dual
enlistment" system, which acts as an end run around the Constitu-
tion's restrictions. 1 6 The evolution of the state militias into the
modern National Guard began a hundred years ago.187 Given
World War I and the Attorney General's "opinion that the Militia
Clauses precluded [the militias'] use outside the Nation's borders,"
in 1916 Congress effectively federalized the National Guard by
stripping Guard members drafted into the regular army of their
state positions. s1 8 While this arrangement secured troops for the
army, it "virtually destroyed the Guard as an effective organization
[because it] terminated the members' status as militiamen, and the
statue did not provide for a restoration of their prewar status as
members of the Guard when they were mustered out of the
Army.",18As a result, the law was amended in 1933 to create the
dual-enlistment system, whereby "all persons who have enlisted in a
State National Guard unit have simultaneously enlisted in the Na-
tional Guard of the United States." 90
Since under dual-enlistment "a member of the Guard who is or-
dered to active duty in the federal service is thereby relieved of his
or her status in the State Guard, "'91 this arrangement avoids certain
constitutional limitations. 192 It reflects the opinion that, while
"[t]he congressional power to call forth the militia may in appro-
priate cases supplement its broader power to raise armies and
provide for the common defense and general welfare... [,] it does




185. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see REVELEY, supra note 78, at 90.
186. Under the dual-enlistment system, members of the National Guard are also
enlisted as members of the National Guard of the United States, which is a reserve compo-
nent of the regular federal armed forces. See Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 345-50,
347 n.19 (1990); 32 U.S.C. § 101 (5), (7) (2000).
187. See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 341-43.
188. Id. at 343-44. This arrangement was upheld in Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S.
366 (1918).
189. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 345.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 346.
192. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the wisdom and constitutionality of this arrange-
ment).
193. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 350.
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This scheme adheres to the constitutional structure, at least to a
point. 4 In a review of this arrangement, the Supreme Court noted
that it provides a gubernatorial veto over those "federal training
mission [s that] interfere with the State Guard's capacity to respond
to local emergencies."'95 Notably, the Court has not directly ad-
dressed what would occur if the National Guard was deployed out
of state before an emergency arose.
The states must have the militias at their disposal in order to
give meaning to the provision of state response to surprise at-
tacks,' 96 as well as to other emergencies that fall within their
authority. Otherwise, the Constitution's provision of state emer-
gency response efforts and the express limitations on federal
authority over the militia would ring hollow. Whether the defects
of the system, highlighted by the present, unprecedented deploy-
ment of National Guard resources overseas at a time of heightened
domestic threat, might render the dual-enlistment system unconsti-
tutional if challenged today remains unknown.
9 7
B. The States Enjoy Certain Inviolable Powers
Being hardwired into the discrete constitutional provisions pre-
viously discussed, "[q]uite likely the states retain a few hard-core
rights that limit national war powers, even after the passing of most
other vestiges of federalism."' 98 This reflects the intent both to effi-
ciently address an infinite array of threats and emergencies, and to
194. This should not suggest that the current level of adherence to the constitutional
structure is sufficient or optimal. See infra Part VI.A (assessing the dual-enlistment system's
constitutionality and desirability).
195. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 351 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 672(f) (1988) (current version at 10
U.S.C. § 12301 (0 (Supp. IV 2004))).
196. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. A state's response to these emergencies takes
place in the absence of a national decision on the matter-i.e., "[n]o State shall, without the
Consent of Congress... engage in War, unless" implies that the militia has not already been
called up by the national government. Id. (emphasis added).
197. As explored in Part VLA, some of the assumptions upon which the constitutional-
ity of the modern dual-enlistment system rests may no longer hold. Compare Perpich, 496 U.S.
at 351 ("The Minnesota unit.., is affected only slightly when a few dozen, or at most a few
hundred, soldiers are ordered into active service for brief periods of time.... [Thus the
state's] ability to rely on its own Guard in state emergency situations, is [not] significantly
affected."), with Bob Anez, Mont. Governor Predicts 'Blowup' Wildfires, A.P., Mar. 4, 2005 (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting that the loss of National
Guard equipment and personnel overseas jeopardized Montana's ability to respond to wild-
fires), and Schmitt, supra note 38 (quoting the head of the National Guard Bureau as stating
that, due to commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, "the Guard [risks] be[ing] broken and
not ready for the next time it's needed, either here at home or for war").
198. REVELEY, supra note 78, at 10.
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protect state sovereignty (and therefore individual liberty) from
national infringement."
Under the Constitution, the militia constitutes a hybrid force. 200
This arrangement respects a continuity of state involvement in the
militia regardless of its actual use. Alexander Hamilton alluded to
this non-diminishing core of state "influence over the militia" when
he asked:
What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from
a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia,
and to command its services when necessary, while the par-
ticular States are to have the sole and exclusive appointment of the
officers? If it were possible seriously to indulge [this fear], the
circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the
States ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt that
this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influ-
ence over the militia.20'
Hamilton here reflects the belief that "[i]f militia officers were
appointed by their friends at the state level ... their ultimate loy-
alty would be to the state, and this would safeguard against federal
oppression."20 2 The state appointment system also carries with it
practical benefits, as it facilitates a rapid and locally knowledgeable
response to crises.
The Second Amendment lends further support to the observa-
tion that the state militias retain effective local power that the
199. The case against federal control of the state militia, which ultimately led to the
compromise contained in the Constitution, reflected both efficiency arguments (e.g., "the
fear that the federal government would call militiamen far away and harass them and the
concern that the states' local needs for the militia would be unmet if the militia was often in
federal service"), and liberty concerns (e.g., "the dominant concern of opponents of clause
fifteen was that it would lead to domestic tyranny"). Hirsch, supra note 159, at 927 (citations
omitted). See also Perpich, 496 U.S. at 340 ("On the one hand, there was a widespread fear
that a national standing Army posed an intolerable threat to individual liberty and to the
sovereignty of the separate States, while, on the other hand, there was a recognition of the
danger of relying on inadequately trained soldiers as the primary means of providing for the
common defense." (citations omitted)).
200. Hirsch, supra note 159, at 925 ("Clause sixteen represented a compromise. While
Congress could prescribe methods of disciplining, arming, and organizing the militia, the
states provided the actual training (except when the militia was called into federal service).
In addition, the power to appoint militia officers was left with the states."). See also U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 16.
201. THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(second emphasis added).
202. Hirsch, supra note 159, at 925.
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national government cannot defang. °s Its inclusion "ensured that
the federal government would not disarm the militias." 24 As such
the Second Amendment protects local armed power from being
either entirely nationalized or disarmed.2 5
The Constitution requires the federal government to always
weigh disagreements with the states as between quasi-equal, armed
powers. In other words, the Second Amendment protects a du-
opoly on the state use of force. With this comes a check on
sovereign power at both the state and federal level.0 6 More practi-
cally, by ensuring that the states remain armed, it allows them to
independently and quickly act in response to emergencies without
having to acquire weaponry, and thus permission, from a central
authority.
Beyond strictly martial powers, states enjoy inherent police pow-
ers. The Constitution, in part through the Tenth Amendment,
20 7
points to the state's general police powers. State law enforcement
activities may be useful in confronting a range of domestic security
challenges, from situations of actual armed conflict to post-disaster
disorder and organized crime.20 As a practical matter, the states
collectively do possess enormous law enforcement resources.2O
203. U.S. CONST. amend II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
204. Hirsch, supra note 159, at 925 n.35.
205. This conclusion can be reached without the need to resolve more controversial
matters concerning an individual right to bear arms.
206. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
207. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."). See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) ("[T]he Tenth Amend-
ment imposes no limitations on the exercise of delegated powers but merely prohibits the
exercise of powers 'not delegated to the United States.'").
208. Recall that the Extradition Clause is not suspended in times of conflict, even for
the extreme and relevant crime of treason. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. See also DEP'T OF
DEF., STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT, supra note 67, at 26 ("The
employment of military forces to conduct missions on US territory is constrained by law and
historic public policy ... Domestic security is primarily a civilian law enforcement func-
tion.").
209. "A 2000 census of state and local law enforcement agencies counted over one mil-
lion full-time law enforcement personnel, while a 2002 survey of federal law enforcement
found approximately 93,000 full-time personnel." Young, supra note 5, at 1280-81 (citing
BRIAN A. REAVES & MAT-HEWJ. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STA-
TISTICS BULLETIN: CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAw ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2000, at 1
(Oct. 2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cslleaOO.pdf, and BRIAN A.
REAVES & LYNN M. BAUER, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN:
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2002, at I (Aug. 2003), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fleo02.pdf).
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This general conclusion gains considerable weight from the fact
that the Constitution not only defines treason, "° but the Extradi-
tion Clause authorizes states to demand the extradition of those
charged with treason.21' Though perhaps surprising today, the Ex-
tradition Clause indicates an intentional and enduring role for
state authorities in responding to, and dealing with, threats to na-
tional security through their criminal justice systems. This includes
times of actual conflict, i.e., "levying War," or potential threat, i.e.,
"adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort."212
V. EMERGENCY FEDERALISM AND THE WAR ON TERROR
Assuming that it may be permissible, the next question is
whether emergency federalism is a desirable policy. In order to ad-
dress this matter, terrorism and the War on Terror must be
defined. Having done so, it becomes apparent that, with respect to
federalism, the War on Terror consists of two elements, a war on
terrorists and homeland security. This analysis concludes with ob-
servations regarding the application of the doctrine of federalism
developed here to practical efforts that might benefit security and
liberty.
A. Name That War
The United States is engaged in a War on Terror,'13 as "[t] he ter-
rorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and
war is what they got. 214 "'War' is neither a persuasive description of
the situation we face nor an adequate statement of our objec-
tives., 21,5 Or perhaps, "[t]his is not a war, but a state of emergency.-2 6
210. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only
in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.").
211. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
212. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 3.
213. The Supreme Court appears to accept the general concept of a 'war on terror,' al-
though it has expressed concern with its undefined nature. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 520 (2004) ("We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the 'war on
terror,' although crucially important, are broad and malleable.").
214. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 40
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 94, 96 (Jan. 20, 2004).
215. HEYMANN, supra note 2, at 19.
216. Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, l13YALE L.J. 1871, 1873 (2004).
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Confronting terrorism contains elements of both a war and a21 ,218
crime . 7 "All terrorist acts are crimes, whether they take place at
home or abroad .2 9 Alternatively, maybe the United States is "fight-
ing a worldwide Islamic insurgency-not criminality or
,,2201terrorism. Or perhaps it might be "a global struggle against vio-
lent extremism.
22'
Since September 11 the United States has engaged terrorists,
and the problem of terrorism more generally, with significant
vigor. The scope of what has taken place, from the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security222 to the passage of intelligence
reform 23 and the Patriot Ac224 to the wars in Afghanistan 25 andi 226
Iraq, far exceeds any counterterrorism effort that could have
217. See generally Feldman, supra note 148 (discussing the criminal and martial ap-
proaches to terrorism).
218. MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Terrorism Knowledge
Base, http://www.tkb.org/Glossary.jsp (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Terrorism
Knowledge Base]. This resource is supported by awards from the Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism and the Office for Domestic Preparedness of the Department of
Homeland Security. MIPT web page, About TKB, http://www.tkb.org/AboutTKB.jsp (last
visited Nov. 30, 2006).
219. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2000).
220. Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror x
(2004); see also id. at 239 (accepting the war modality).
221. Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Rumsfeld Seeks Broad Review of Iraq Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2005, at Al, All.
222. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
223. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-408,
118 Stat, 3638.
224. Patriot Act, supra note 68.
225. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 363 (including operations in Afghanistan as
part of the War on Terror) ("Calling this struggle a war accurately describes the use of
American and allied armed forces to find and destroy terrorist groups and their allies in the
field, notably in Afghanistan." (emphasis added)).
226. The question of whether the invasion of Iraq constitutes part of a larger War on
Terror, or a diversion from it, remains an issue of considerable disagreement. This diver-
gence was highlighted during the 2004 presidential campaign when President Bush asserted
that "[i] n Iraq, we saw a threat, and we realized that after September the 11 th, we must take
threats seriously, before they fully materialize," while challenger SenatorJohn Kerry offered
that "smart means not diverting your attention from the real war on terror in Afghanistan
against Osama bin Laden and taking if off to Iraq." Debate Transcript, Commission on
Presidential Debates, Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004a.html (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Parallels can be drawn suggest-
ing that the situation in Iraq could create conditions similar to those that gave rise to Al
Qaeda. Compare NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, MAPPING THE GLOBAL FUTURE: REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL's 2020 PROJECT 94 (2004) (hereinafter 2020 PRO-
JECT) ("Iraq and other possible conflicts in the future could provide recruitment, training
grounds, technical skills and language proficiency for a new class of terrorists who are 'profes-
sionalized' and for whom political violence becomes an end in itself."), with 9/11 REPORT,
supra note 14, at 55 ("A decade of conflict in Afghanistan ... gave Islamist extremists a rallying
point and training field.... Young Muslims from around the world flocked to Afghanistan to
join as volunteers in what was seen as a 'holy war'-ihad--against an invader."). See also Dana
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been reasonably anticipated before that date.2 7 Yet, as the forego-
ing shows, surprisingly little agreement exists about the exact
nature of the threat. No consensus exists as to whether the War on
Terror falls more along the lines of the War on Drugs or the "Long
War" against fascism and communism.2 28 No consistent legal defini-
tion of terrorism even exists.
2 29
For the purposes of this Article, terrorism need not be defined
with exacting specificity-it may very well be a war, a crime, both,
or neither. Though not unimportant, from the viewpoint of feder-
alism, such definitions miss the mark. Rather, following the analysis
in Parts II and III, by mapping the Constitution's general guidance
about emergency federalism onto the reality of terrorism, terrorism
can be assessed within the basic structure of federalism.
Such analysis suggests that, in terms of emergency federalism,
the War on Terror exists on two planes: a war on terrorists and
homeland security. While the states should play a role in both,
their primary responsibilities fall within the latter category. Given
this division, the priorities of the one, the war on terrorists, cannot
totally override the other, homeland security.
Priest, Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground: War Created Haven, CIA Advisers Report, WASH. POST,
Jan. 14, 2005, at Al ("Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as the training ground for the next
generation of 'professionalized' terrorists, according to a report released yesterday by the
National Intelligence Council, the CIA director's think tank.").
227. See generally 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 71-143, 174-214; DANIEL BENJAMIN &
STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR: RADICAL ISLAM'S WAR AGAINST AMERICA 219-
349 (Random House 2002).
228. See generally PHILIP BoBBirrr, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE
COURSE OF HISTORY passim (Anchor Books 2002) (articulating the theory of the "Long
War"). The Long War is defined to include "the First and Second World Wars, the Bolshevik
Revolution and the Spanish Civil War, the Korean and Viet Nam Wars, and the Cold War."
Id. at 19.
229. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2000) (defining terrorism as a crime); 6 U.S.C.
§ 101 (15) (Supp. IV 2004) (defining terrorism for homeland security purposes); 22 U.S.C.
§ 2656f(d) (Supp. IV 2004) (defining terrorism for purposes of State Department reporting
requirements). See also INGRID DETrER, THE LAW OF WAR 23 (2d ed. 2000) (indicating that,
of the current international conventions related to terrorism, "none of them contain any
useful definition of terrorism; nor does the current literature on terrorism provide much
clarification"); Ad Hoc Comm. established by Gen. Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 Dec.
2006, Report oftheAd Hoc Committee, Annex II, art. 2, U.N. Doc A/57/37 (Jan. 28, 2002) (con-
taining the proposed text of Article 2, defining terrorism, of the draft Convention on
Terrorism). See also Ed McCullough, Annan Calls for Treaty Outlawing Terrorism, A.P., March.
10, 2005 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (noting
"[allthough the United Nations and its agencies already have 12 treaties covering terrorism,




Regardless of whether terrorism should be fought with the mili-
tary, law enforcement, or something else, at its heart "[t] errorism is
a tactic used by individuals and organizations to kill and destroy.
''
21
Focusing on terrorism as a tactic, "[t]errorism is violence, or the
threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and
alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they
would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they de-
sired to take."23' In sum, in the War on Terror "[tihe enemy is
terrorism-premeditated, politically motivated violence perpe-
trated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents."
23 2
Though not in agreement on the specifics, both United States
law and international law generally agree with this approach, which
holds that terrorism involves intentional violence, or the threat of
violence, that seeks to coerce or manipulate towards a particular
end, an end that is effective at the societal or national level.
Thus, at least in part, terrorists can be defined in relation to the
tactics they employ. Thus, terrorists are those individuals or organi-
zations that, either directly or indirectly, seek to carry out terrorist
acts.23 4 As history shows, terrorists may be individuals, non-state ac-
tors, nation states, or some unholy alliance of the three. The
general objective of "It]hose who employ terrorism, regardless of
their specific secular or religious objectives, [is] to subvert the rule
of law and effect change through violence and fear."
2 35
C. The War on Terrorists and Homeland Security
It remains to be determined how terrorism fits into the overall
scheme of federalism. Upon consideration, it appears that the War
on Terror properly divides into two categories, the war on terrorists
and homeland security. The states are in a position to aid in both,
though more significantly in the latter category.
230. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 363.
231. Terrorism Knowledge Base, supra note 218; See also DErER, supra note 229, at 23
(concluding that "[t]errorism is thus basically 'extortionate'").
232. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 1.
233. See supra note 229.
234. See, e.g., Terrorism Knowledge Base, supra note 218 (defining terrorism and its rela-
tion to acts committed by terrorists).
235. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 1.
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1. Learning from the Experience of Terrorism
The United States' response to terrorism cannot be considered
outside the experience of September 11.236 While the country had
been attacked before, 37 including attacks by the same organiza-
tion"8 and a prior attack on the World Trade Center in New York, 39
by any measure the actuality of September 11 stands alone.
Given the existence of other, prior plots evidencing similar in-
tent, complexity, and potential fatalities,2 4 preventing "another
September 11" or something worse, such as a "nuclear September
11," has become a top national priority. Significantly, in large part,
existing counterterrorism efforts are aimed specifically at the per-
petrators of September 11, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, as well
236. See supra Part 1.
237. The bombing on April 19, 1995 of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
the worst prior domestic terror attack, resulted in 168 fatalities. See Oklahoma City National
Memorial, http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2006); see
also Terrorism Knowledge Base, supra note 218 (providing an Incident profile of the Okla-
homa City Bombing). While true comparisons between such events cannot be made, by way
of reference 2,973 people died on September 11; an estimated 16,400 to 18,800 people were
in the World Trade Center complex at the time the first plane struck, which indicates the
death toll could have been several multiples higher absent the heroic rescue and evacuation
efforts. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 311, 316; see also NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND
TECH., FEDERAL BUILDING AND FIRE SAFETY INVESTIGATION OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
DISASTER (BRIEFING) 79 (2005), available at http://wtc.nist.gov/pubs/MediaPub-
licBriefing_.040505_final.pdf ("Had the buildings been full, it is possible that as many as
14,000 people may have lost their lives based on rough estimates using existing models."). A
more apt comparison might be to the December 7, 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor,
which killed 2,390. See National Park Service, U.S.S. Arizona Memorial, http://
www.nps.gov/u sar (last visitedJan. 16, 2006).
238. See, e.g., 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 115-19, 190-97 (detailing attacks against
American embassies in Africa in August 1998 and against the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000).
239. See id. at 71-73.
240. One planned attempt, the Bojinka Plot, "intended bombing of 12 U.S. commercial
jumbo jets over the Pacific during a two-day span." 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 147. The
Landmarks Plot sought to "bomb major New York landmarks, including the Holland and
Lincoln tunnels." Id. at 72. Planned attacks around the millennial celebrations included
multiple bombings in and around Jordan as well as an attack on the Los Angeles airport. Id.
at 174-82. Even excluding those taking place in terrorist hot-spots such as Iraq and Israel,
since September 11, several large-scale terrorist strikes against civilian targets have been
carried out. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, Bombing at Resort in Indonesia Kills 150 and Hurts Scows
More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, § 1, at 1; C.J. Chivers & Steve Lee Myers, 250 Die as Siege at
Russian School Ends in Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2004, at Al; Alan Cowell, Subway and Bus
Blasts in London Kill at Least 37, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at Al; Mona El-Naggar & Greg
Myre, Blasts in Egypt Kill at Least 59 at Sinai Resort, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at Al; Eclaine
Sciolino, 10 Bombs Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at Al; Mi-




as similar terrorist groups or state sponsors known, or suspected, of
engaging in terrorism 24
2. The War on Terrorists
September 11 was an event of violence, embedded within a pat-
tern of similar and attempted attacks. 242 The responses to
September 11 specifically targeting Al Qaeda have ranged from
domestic criminal investigations to military action overseas.243 The
crucial question for this Article is how such efforts relate to the ob-
served characteristics of emergency federalism.
Applying the overlay developed in Parts II and III, a battle such
as that against Al Qaeda appears to fall within the category of con-
flicts in which the national government plays the leading role. It is,
in brief, a "war on terrorists," that is, a war against those who or-
ganize and engage in terrorism. Al Qaeda has conducted missions
both within and without the United States,2" with the objective of
destroying the country as now constituted.2 45 Its use of hijacked air-
craft and its interest in weapons of mass destruction, as well as its
attacks on military installations, lend credence to its capacity to
inflict substantial harm.2 46 As a known, albeit shadowy, entity, Al
Qaeda poses the type of threat that the Framers believed the fed-
eral authority should take the lead role in combating.4 7 The war on
terrorists is likely to continue for some time.248 However, unlike the
241. See generally NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2 (generally defining the terrorist
threat in relation to groups like Al Qaeda).
242. See supra notes 237-240.
243. Press Release, White House, Three Years of Progress in the War on Terror (Sept.
11, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.go v/news/releases/2004/09/20040911.html
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
244. See supra notes 237-240.
245. See Osama bin Laden, Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the
Land of the Two Holy Places (Aug. 1996), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
terrorism/international/fat wa_1996.html (last visitedJan. 16, 2006).
246. See generally 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 47-214 (chronicling the history of Al
Qaeda and its terrorist plots through the final stages of planning for September 11).
247. The Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force that followed Septem-
ber 11 illustrates this approach. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001) ("[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.").
248. Measured from September 11, 2001, the war against Al Qaeda is already longer
than the United States' involvement in the Second World War. Measured from the organiza-
tion's involvement in attacks on American interests in Somalia in 1992 and in the first World
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War on Terror, which may exist indefinitely,2 49 the war on terrorists
should have relatively greater temporal limitations, at least with re-
250spect to particular defined enemies.
The repercussions and limitations of this approach must be con-
sidered. Two stand out. First, federalism cannot answer the larger
question of whether this is a "war" or whether a particular overseas
engagement properly fits within such a war. All that emergency
federalism can suggest is whether or not a particular threat falls on
the federal side of the national/homeland domestic security power
continuum.
Consequently, since the conflict in Iraq, as well as that with Al
Qaeda, has the hallmark of those confrontations over which the
federal government enjoys relatively more power vis-a-vis the states,
and since the federal government has announced that both are
part of the War on Terror,51 then as far as federalism is concerned,
both exist within the war on terrorists. Only application of other
constitutional tools outside the present focus may determine
whether either conflict may be otherwise distinguished.
Second, as discussed in Part II, the Constitution incorporates
principles of federalism when addressing threats to national secu-
rity and actual conflicts. This is true, particularly within the
domestic sphere, even when the federal power reaches its apex. 212 As a
consequence, even accepting the most expansive approach to the
Trade Center Bombing in February 1993, the conflict with Al Qaeda is now in its thirteenth
year, making it approximately as long as the (to date considerably more deadly) Vietnam
War. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 59-61, 71-73 (detailing Al Qaeda's links to attacks
on the United States and its interests during the first half of the 1990's).
249. "There can be no final victory in the fight against terrorism, for terrorism (rather
than full-scale war) is the contemporary manifestation of conflict, and conflict will not dis-
appear from earth." Roger Cohen, What's in itforAmerica, N.Y. TiMES, March 6, 2005, § 4, at
1 (quoting Walter Laqueur).
250. See, e.g., 2020 PROJECT, supra note 226, at 94 ("expect[ing] that by 2020 al-Qa'ida
will have been superceded by similarly inspired but more diffuse Islamic extremist groups").
For the war against terrorists similar to Al Qaeda, it appears possible, at the very least, to
divide it up into discrete anti-terrorist campaigns, such as the War on the Taliban, the War
on Al Qaeda, or perhaps now the War on Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Iraq-based organization of
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Such groupings fit roughly with the approach taken in defining a
'Long War' between parliamentary democracy, fascism, and communism. See BOBBrrr, supra
note 228, at 19. Alternatively, these conflicts could bear the same relation as the Korean and
Vietnam Wars did to the Cold War.
251. See, e.g., Three Years of Progress in the War on Terror, supra note 243, ("We were
right to go into Iraq .... Although we have not found stockpiles of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, in the world after September 11th, that was a risk we could not afford to take."). See also
supra note 226 (highlighting the debate over the official federal treatment of Iraq as part of
the war on terror).
252. See supra Part II.
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war on terrorists,253 emergency federalism remains legitimate, rele-
vant, and in force. Both because it is intended to promote security
and liberty,254 and because the Constitution provides the means to
enforce the doctrine in practice, 55 emergency federalism offers a
realistic option for improving America's engagement of terrorists.
3. Homeland Security
While September 11 highlights the national dimensions of ter-
rorism, November 9 suggests that a local focus must also be
considered alongside the global "war on terrorists"-namely,
homeland security.
On November 9, 1990, El-Sayyid Nosair shot Meir Kahane in
New York City. Though federal investigators assisted local police
with the investigation, it initially appeared to be the act of a lone,
mentally unstable individual. Years passed before Nosair's ties to Al
Qaeda became apparent. '
The experience of El-Sayyid Nosair highlights the problems in-
herent to terrorism. At its heart, "[t]errorism is a tactic used by
individuals and organizations to kill and destroy."57 From a consti-
tutional perspective, this presents the problem of combating a
tactic when the aims, actors, or even the act itself may be obscured
or not yet fully formed. This is the challenge of homeland security.
Excepting some limited issues as to the employment of the states
in overseas battle,5 s from the standpoint of federalism it remains
the national government's prerogative to decide whether and how
it might wish to wage a war on terrorism abroad. The balance shifts
when considering terrorism within the United States. Taken as a
tactic, terrorism is likely to exist for an indefinite period of time;
after all, under other names it has existed since the nation's found-
ing. Terrorism in this sense represents a potential threat of an
ever-shifting nature. Thus, like natural disasters and similar emer-
gencies, within the domestic sphere terrorism is exactly the type of
national security concern to which the Constitution assigns signifi-
cant state responsibility.
2 59
253. See supra note 74.
254. See supra Part III.
255. See supra Part IV.
256. See BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 227, at 3-7.
257. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 363 (emphasis added).
258. The dual-enlistment system is a possible exception to this. See infra Part VIA
259. See supra Part II.
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Admitting the problems of separating out generalized concern
over terrorism from the specifics of a group such as Al Qaeda, the
point to be understood from the Constitution's perspective is that
the states bear a substantial responsibility in protecting against cer-
tain aspects of terrorism's threat, ranging from law enforcement to
260general emergency response.
This should not suggest that the national government abdicate
responsibility. Rather, as the National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) concluded,
"long-term success [against terrorism] demands the use of all ele-
ments of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law
enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and
homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we
leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort. 2 61 Only
by proceeding out of respect for the Constitution's division of na-
tional power may such success be achieved; otherwise, the risk
exists that the full vigor of government will be sapped and misap-
plied.
An objection might be raised that defining homeland security as
an area of significant state responsibility represents an inappropri-
ate approach to terrorism. In short, terrorism is unique in a way
that differentiates it from other problems. On this point, the Na-
tional Strategy for Combating Terrorism (the National Strategy)
212proves instructive. A product of the administration of President
George W. Bush, it outlines a hawkish, federal government-centric
approach to the war on terrorism.263 Yet, though it does not explic-
itly focus on matters of federalism, it presents a vision of terrorism
that closely mirrors the emergency federalism described in Part
I .2 6
For instance, the National Strategy contains a series of charts
that portray the threat of terrorism waxing and waning along two
axes: along one, the scope of a terrorist organization may range
from local to global, while along the other, the severity of the
265threat rises from low to high. The bottom category of the arc
formed by such organizations, those with the most localized and
least severe threat, are those that fall under homeland security,
while those at the other end of the spectrum-global, high-danger
260. See id.
261. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 363-64.
262. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2.
263. See generally id.




entities such as Al Qaeda-represent the object of the war on ter-
rorists.
Tellingly, the National Strategy identifies as an ultimate objective
pushing all terrorist organizations into the least dangerous quad-
rant, that discussed here as an object for homeland security
(though not by implication excluding all federal involvement).1
66
Terrorists in this category are defined by four characteristics that
mirror those proposed earlier in this Article:2 67 "Unorganized,"
"Localized," "Non-sponsored," and "Rare."268 The goal is to "Return
Terrorism to the 'Criminal Domain.' ,2 69 Thus, the National Strat-
egy presents a framework implicitly in harmony with the
application of emergency federalism.
V-. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF EMERGENCY FEDERALISM
The purpose of the analysis thus far has been to legitimatize a
space for state action within the War on Terror. Consequently, a
full exploration of how to apply federalism to terrorism lies beyond
the scope of the current Article. Nevertheless, a few observations
may be made regarding how emergency federalism might apply to
exemplary, observed problems regarding the war on terrorists and
homeland security. These can be framed around the twin interests
that federalism serves-efficacy (security) and liberty.
Today, neoconservatives and arch-nationalists speak of national
power that is coextensive with the demands of security: "Within the
limits that the Constitution itself imposes, the scope and distribu-
tion of the powers to protect national security must be construed
to authorize the most efficacious defense of the nation and its in-
terests in accordance 'with the realistic purposes of the entire
instrument.' ,270 Others emphasize that "recognizing the States'
constitutional power is a necessary means of ensuring that our fed-
eral government devotes the time and the resources to fulfill its
266. Id. at 13 fig. 3.
267. See supra Part II (distinguishing between existential and non-existential threats, as
well as between threats and conflicts and between the domestic and foreign spheres).
268. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 13 fig. 3. Compare id. (describing terrorism
within the ambit of homeland security using these terms: "Unorganized," "Localized," "non-
sponsored," and "Rare"), with Part II (discussing federal versus state responsibility with re-
gard to potential threats in similar terms related to geographic scope and the severity of the
threat posed).
269. Id.
270. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 489, (quoting Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.
742, 782 (1948)).
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most important role-protecting us from our enemies."271 Similarly,
in the realm of civil liberties, the bipartisan 9/11 Commission has
called for acknowledging that the "shift of power and authority to
the government [in response to terrorism] calls for an enhanced
system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that
are vital to our way of life."272
Given the uniqueness of September 11, it should not be surpris-
ing that the initial solutions pursued will not always prove to be the
most effective, an observation that arguably has been borne out by
the experience of Hurricane Katrina. For present purposes, it is
sufficient to examine briefly one example of a claimed inefficiency
that potentially impinges on homeland security. Additionally, one
area of domestic civil rights concern also bears consideration.
A. Security v. Security: The National Guard
The condition of the National Guard the day Katrina bore down
on New Orleans, almost exactly four years after Al Qaeda struck
New York and Washington, reflects decisions made in Washing-
ton. 2 73 De facto nationalization of the Guard when states were
facing considerable threats had come to constitute a misallocation
between the federal and state governments.
Not long ago it could still be argued that the Founders' "fear of
states being left without sufficient forces for their own internal
needs has ... proven unfounded" and that "[s]imilarly, the con-
cern about Guard members being sent far away for lengthy periods
against their will has proven unfounded. 2 7 4 In a pre-September 11
decision upholding the constitutionality of the dual-enlistment sys-
271. Greenhouse, Federalism and September 11, supra note 5; see also Governors Balk at Big-
ger Role for Military, A.P., Nov. 6, 2005 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) ("It's a bad idea for the military to make that decision and usurp the authority that
under the U.S. Constitution stays with the governor and local authorities." (quoting Gover-
nor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas)).
272. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 394.
273. See supra Part I.B (discussing Hurricane Katrina and the National Guard). Note
that criticism has been directed at the effects of a perceived over-reliance on the military
more generally, including the National Guard, in the prosecution of the War on Terror. See
Thorn Shanker, All Quiet on the Home Front, and Some Soldiers Are Asking Why, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 2005, at A18 ("'Nobody in America is asked to sacrifice, except us,' said one officer just
back from a yearlong tour in Iraq, voicing a frustration now drawing the attention of aca-
demic specialists in military sociology.").
274. Hirsch, supra note 159, at 947-48.
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tem, the Supreme Court indicated in dictum that it found such a
rationale persuasive This may no longer be the case.
National Guard members today are increasingly stationed over-
seas for long deployments, 276 and their governors have vocalized
concerns.2 77 At home, the announcement of Air National Guard
base closures and realignments led Pennsylvania Governor Edward
G. Rendell to charge that the move "would strip the state's efforts
to prevent a terrorist attack and respond to natural disasters," while
Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon alleged that, "[such plans] would
leave the Pacific Northwest with a Little League air defense capabil-
ity."278 In the case of the Army National Guard, such fears became
reality for Louisiana; Governor Kathleen Blanco has remarked that
"5,000 [state Guard troops] out, at one time... serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan" at the time of Katrina "certainly [was] a factor."279
This situation raises three concerns, one obvious and the others
less so. The obvious problem is that, in the event of another
September 11, Hurricane Katrina, or worse, the United States may
lack the domestic capacity to mount a rapid and effective response
and recovery effort without resort to either active-duty forces or
federal martial law.2s° By design, the Guard is intended to be used
by state authorities for these kinds of efforts, 8' yet in the eyes of
many state officials, unilateral decisions at the federal level have
275. Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 351 (1990) (finding that, under the chal-
lenged federal conditions, Minnesota's "ability to rely on its own Guard in state emergency
situations, is [not] significantly affected").
276. See supra Part I.B. The National Guard has become so stretched by foreign de-
ployments that its leadership began considering changing the structure of deployments,
from a maximum of two years during one's entire time in the Guard to a cap of two years at a
time. Schmitt & Shanker, infra note 221.
277. See Balz, supra note 39; Schmitt, Air Guard Bases, supra note 16; see also supra Part
I.B.
278. Schmitt, Air Guard Bases, supra note 16, at A18.
279. Lipton, Political Issues, supra note 55, at A22.
280. This runs counter to a long history of restricting the use of active-duty forces
within the United States. See supra note 83 (discussing the Posse Comitatus Act). According
to at least one press report, Hurricane Katrina caused the White House to seriously consider
"whether the president should speed the arrival of active-duty troops by seizing control of
the hurricane relief mission from the governor" through invocation of the Insurrection Act.
Lipton, Political Issues, supra note 55. That storm also triggered calls by some, including the
President, to plan for expanded use of federal troops in future domestic crises-calls to
which several state governors vigorously objected. See Block & Schatz, supra note 3 (report-
ing that the head of NORTHCOM "has told lawmakers that active-duty forces should be
given complete authority for responding to catastrophic disasters" and that the President
has "suggested that the military be ready to quarantine cities and states in the event of a flu
pandemic"); Governors Balk at Bigger Role for Military, supra note 271.
281. Similarly, under current Department of Defense plans for homeland security and
emergency response "[p]articular reliance is being placed on the National Guard." Graham,
supra note 67, at A7.
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severely degraded the Guard's capacity.8 2 This drives a negative
feedback loop, whereby Guard units are diminished,83 a disaster
then occurs that shows state resources are inadequate, which leads
to calls for increased national involvement to compensate for those
state deficiencies that resulted in part from national decisions.
Less obviously, upsetting the natural constitutional balance of
control over the Guard risks diminishing the quality of the disaster
response even if the total level of resources remains constant. As
Florida Governor Jeb Bush has warned, "If you federalize [the
emergency response to catastrophic events], all the innovation,
creativity and knowledge at the local level would subside."285 In
keeping with public goods theory,286 to the extent that local first
responders and state National Guard units can deliver spatially
relevant knowledge and expertise, federalism argues that replacing
them with otherwise similar national forces risks a less effective re-
sponse.
Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, the ease with which the
national government can employ the National Guard overseas
raises efficacy concerns because it alters the calculus of going to
war. Since the Framers did not contemplate the use of the militia
overseas, the Constitution intended that calculations over
282. See, e.g., Dreazen & Lueck, supra note 41 (following a presidential proposal to de-
ploy National Guard units along the Mexican border for immigration control purposes,
several lawmakers noted that the Guard units "are meant to be at the ready in case of a natu-
ral disaster in their home states" and that Hurricane Katrina "demonstrated the risks of
allocating National Guard forces elsewhere"); Schmitt, Air Guard Bases, supra note 16, (re-
porting criticism by state officials and representatives of a proposed federal plan to overhaul
Air National Guard units, which in their view would leave "states without emergency aircraft
to fight fires, recover from hurricanes and cope with other natural disasters" while also in-
creasing vulnerability to terrorists). Illustrating the tension between national and local
priorities, among the Air National Guard bases slated for closure is Otis Air National Guard
Base, which launched the first air response to the hijackings of September 11. See id.; 9/11
REPORT, supra note 14 (discussing the role of the Otis Air National Guard Base on Septem-
ber 11).
283. As is discussed below in Part VI.B., states also may suffer in other ways, including
being under-funded in terms of federal homeland security funds relative to their objective
risk profile.
284. For example, following the experience of Hurricane Katrina, federal officials at
FEMA and NORTHCOM moved to assert federal primacy over the response to Hurricane
Wilma in Florida. State officials pushed back and eventually secured control of the effort. See
Block & Schatz, Authorities Battle to Contro4 supra note 3.
285. See id.
286. See supra Part III.A.
287. See Hirsch, supra note 159, at 931 ("Might it even be that the framers believed the
federal government could call forth the militia for such foreign operations as might be nec-
essary such as attacking an enemy or defending a friend or ally ... ? This last leap cannot be
made, for there is no evidence that the framers contemplated the use of the militia for such
purposes."); see also Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 343-44, 343 n.13 (1990) (imply-
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whether to engage in war overseas would hinge upon the use of the
regular army. By appropriating the National Guard as a substantial
part of the forces deployed in an active-combat zone, thirty-five to
forty percent of those in Iraq, ss the federal government is deciding
to go to war on the "cheap." This does not mean that the overall
cost is any lower. Rather, it allows Washington to contemplate a
similar level of success for itself (victory), while shifting some of the
cost ("broken" military units) to the states. "89 As a consequence, the
current National Guard system both diminishes the states' ability to
provide for homeland security and encourages potentially ineffi-
cient decision-making regarding the choice of the national
government to enter into foreign military conflicts.
Given these problems, which are rooted in the dual-enlistment
system, there are at least two possible means for redress outside of
voluntary federal restraint. The first of these is unlikely to provide
a permanent solution, while the second would prove difficult to
achieve.
First, a state may organize and fund its own defensive force, in-
dependent and apart from the largely federally funded National
Guard.29° While this would solve the issue of states being left with-
out the power to effectively respond to, and deter, emergencies
including terrorist strikes, it would not address federal overuse of
the National Guard. More to the point, this route appears imprac-
ticable as it would require a state to create, in essence, a duplicate
state militia.
Second, the constitutionality of the current dual-enlistment
scheme should be questioned.291 Since the Constitution's text, the
ing that, under the Militia Clauses and absent the dual-enlistment scheme, the retention of
the militia's separate state status when called into federal service might preclude its use
overseas).
288. Supra note 35-38.
289. Since the federal government largely funds the National Guard, cost in this sense
means the loss of the Guard as an available instrument of power. See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 351
("The Federal Government provides virtually all of the funding, the materiel [sic], and the
leadership for the State Guard units.").
290. 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000) ("In addition to its National Guard, if any, a State or
Territory, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, or the District of Columbia may, as provided by its
laws, organize and maintain defense forces. A defense force established under this section
may be used within the jurisdiction concerned, as its chief executive (or commanding gen-
eral in the case of the District of Columbia) considers necessary, but it may not be called,
ordered, or drafted into the armed forces.").
291. At present, the dual-enlistment system is constitutionally valid. See Perpich, 496 U.S.
at 349-50 (citing Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)). However, in Perpich, the
constitutionality of the system was not directly challenged. Id. at 347 ("The Governor does
not, however, challenge the authority of Congress to create a dual enlistment program."). As
of this writing, "Illinois and Pennsylvania have gone so far as to file suit in federal court
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relevant drafting history, and the observed structural design of fed-
eralism all suggest that the states are to control the militia subject
only to three exceptions, the line extending from Selective Draft Law
Cases seems unstable. Given that the dual-enlistment system has
now proven to be functionally unbalanced, the time has come for a
critical reevaluation.
Ideally, such a review would originate within the political
branches of the federal government. Unfortunately, this appears
unlikely since judicial involvement in state-initiated suits may be
unavoidable. 2 In the event of adjudication, one possible analytical
approach would be through the principle of evisceration along the
lines of the holding in Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n. v. Gibbons.9
In Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n, the Supreme Court invalidated
a statute that violated the Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity require-
ment, 29' even though it could have been sustained under the
Commerce Clause.9 5 It did so by stating that "if we were to hold
that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the
Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bank-
ruptcy laws. "29 Similarly, the Court could plausibly find that the
current National Guard system tramples upon the express limita-
tions placed on Congress and the President by the Militia Clauses,
even though this system might be otherwise sustainable. Such a
conclusion would require the Court to revisit how it approaches
these provisions.297
contending that the Defense Department [through the Defense Base Closure and Realign-
ment Commission] cannot move Air Guard units without the consent of the state governors
.... " Schmitt, Air Guard Bases, supra note 16, at Al. Even "[l]awyers on the commission have
said the governors may indeed have a sound legal argument, and, as a result, the Justice
Department has been called in to give its opinion." Id. These cases might raise issues regard-
ing the constitutionality of dual enlistment.
292. See supra note 291 (noting current state challenges to the federal Air National
Guard base closure plans); Governors Balk at Bigger Role for Military, supra note 271 (reporting
that governors in Washington, Mississippi, Michigan, Arkansas, West Virginia, Delaware and
Alabama have "panned the idea" that "active-duty military take a greater role in disaster
response," including "questioning whether it would even be constitutional").
293. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). But see Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (upholding a statute under the
Commerce Clause that could not be sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment given the
precedent of the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
294. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
296. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1982).
297. See Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 349 (1990) ("[Tjhe Militia Clauses are-
as the constitutional text plainly indicates-additional grants of power to Congress." (citing
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 377, 381-84)).
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In addition to this constitutional claim, the Supreme Court
might also be swayed by the present factual context. In Perpich, the
Court stated in dicta that the challenged federal use of state Guard
units did not significantly impact the state's ability to respond to
emergencies.29 8 By contrast, ample evidence now exists that over-
seas commitments have degraded the Guard's ability to serve at
home at a time when the importance of its domestic mission has
dramatically increased for the foreseeable future.2M In addition,
federal decisions regarding the domestic posturing of Air National
Guard resources have attracted considerable state criticism. 300
On the one hand, a decision holding the dual-enlistment system
constitutionally defective would be extremely difficult to reach,
requiring great dexterity in the details. It would necessitate an
overhaul of the nation's system of defense. Such a judicial deter-
mination would in fact be only the first step in a process ultimately
led by the executive and legislative branches, in consultation with
the states, to determine how to repurpose the Guard. This is by
many orders of magnitude a far more complex and risky prospect
than striking down a bankruptcy law. However, the interests being
protected, state sovereignty and the effective provision of home-
land security, are also much greater. It ultimately raises a question
of conflicting state and federal executive authorities each when
facing security threats, the apex of their respective authority.0 '
B. Protecting Civil Liberties: The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
Since September 11, the federal government-by statute,"'
through the courts, and perhaps most vigorously through
298. Id. at 351.
299. See generally supra Part I.B.
300. See Schmitt, Air Guard Bases, supra note 16.
301. Even assuming that Congress acquiesces to the President's current exercise of
power over the National Guard, this leaves open the question of where the President's au-
thority ultimately ends and that of the Governors begins. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum
.... If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the
Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power." (emphasis added)).
302. The Patriot Act has become the focus of considerable debate on this subject. Pa-
triot Act, supra note 68. Compare Editorial, Revising the Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, §
4, at 11 (arguing for a revision of the Patriot Act based on perceived abuses) and Althouse,
supra note 5, at 1253 (noting "[c]oncerns about racial profiling, invasions of privacy, unrea-
sonable searches, and infringement on free speech"), with Fields & Squeo, Bipartisan Fix for
Patriot Act Takes Shape, supra note 172.
303. See In re Sealed Case, 310 E3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review
2002).
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executive action °4 - has expanded national authority in response
to terrorism. These actions have drawn considerable criticism for
risking violations of civil liberties without providing corollary
security benefits.
305
The 9/11 Commission recommended "an enhanced system of
checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital
to our way of life.0 06 Similarly, the Office of Homeland Security,
now the Department of Homeland Security, stated as part of its na-
tional vision that "we should refrain from instituting unnecessary
laws, as we remain true to our principles of federalism and individ-
ual freedom. 0 07 Perhaps most significantly speaking to the issue of
executive power, the Supreme Court has held that "a state of war is
not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of
the Nation's citizens."
0 8
The examples from the Supreme Court and the 9/11 Commis-
sion are instructive because they illustrate how the courts and the
political branches can serve the interests of liberty. However, by
constitutional design, the states can also provide a liberty guar-
anty.an While several approaches could serve this end, the most
salient might be the anti-commandeering doctrine.
Under the anti-commandeering doctrine, "[t]he Federal Gov-
ernment may not compel the States to enact or administer a
304. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (though the Supreme Court
did not determine its viability, it noted the executive's contention that "no explicit congres-
sional authorization is required [to detain citizens as enemy combatants], because the
Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution");
John C. Yoo, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the Presi-
dent, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and
Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
warpowers925.htm (arguing that decision "as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military
force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response ... are for
the President alone to make" and, as such, no statute passed by Congress can place any limit
on the President in these areas); Sanger, supra note 71 (reporting that President Bush ac-
knowledged that he "had secretly instructed the [National Security Agency] to intercept the
communications of Americans and terrorist suspects inside the United States, without first
obtaining warrants from a secret court that oversees intelligence matters").
305. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No balances: Discarding Bedrock Constitu-
tional Principles, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
74, 99 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig,Jr. eds., 2004) (arguing that "[t]he Bush administra-
tion's counterterrorism strategy is not captured by the clich6 about 'shifting the balance'
from liberty to security because so many of its actions encroach on liberty without enhancing
security").
306. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 14, at 394.
307. HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 42, at 48.
308. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 587 (1952)).
309. See supra Part III. B.
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federal regulatory program." ' In operation, under this doctrine
" It] he national government is free to take the steps it wants to take
with its own personnel and state and local government is able to
refuse to contribute to those efforts."11
The anti-commandeering approach, adopted by the Supreme
Court in a strict, bright-line form,t2 becomes more attractive " [t] he
more intrusive on individual rights particular measures are" be-
cause "[b]y denying the means of commandeering to the federal
government, the courts have created an incentive to adopt policies
that inspire compliance, thus preserving a beneficial structural
safeguard for individual rights."3 1 3 However, as Justice John Paul
Stevens' dissent in Printz argued, doctrinal rigidity risks non-
compliance from local officials at the worst possible moments:
Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the ad-
ministration of a military draft, the mass inoculation of
children to forestall an epidemic, or perhaps the threat of an
international terrorist, may require a national response before
federal personnel can be made available to respond. If the
Constitution empowers Congress and the President to make
an appropriate response, is there anything in the Tenth
Amendment... that forbids the enlistment of state officers to
make that response effective?
314
In Printz, Justice Stevens expressed a concern that the majority's
ostensibly liberty-protective rule would fail in an emergency situa-
tion due to a lack of consideration for security concerns. This line
of criticism can be addressed in two ways.
First, Justice Stevens' concern arose from the perceived inappli-
cability of the anti-commandeering doctrine, which had been
developed out of Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment Fed-
eralism, to issues of national security. As the present Article argues,
there is a strong case for an independent strain of emergency fed-
eralism designed for, and therefore applicable to, precisely the
kinds of situations Justice Stevens contemplated.
Second, state governments are not without incentives to follow
the national government's lead. In most instances, especially
310. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (quoting New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
311. Althouse, supra note 5, at 1271.
312. See Pintz, 521 U.S. at 932-33.
313. Althouse, supra note 5, at 1272.
314. Printz, 521 U.S. at 940 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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emergencies, there are compelling reasons to believe that state and
local authorities will comply with federal requests." In those rare
instances where a state might resist, it would do so after finding the
cost of compliance-in terms of liberty or security-too great to
bear. In such situations, the theory of federalism explored in Part
III suggests that state inaction serves both liberty and efficacy. The
mere possibility of state resistance may become increasingly impor-
tant as the national government contemplates an increased
domestic role for the regular armed forces following future terror-
ist attacks or natural disasters.1 6
The theory of federalism put forth in this Article does not, by it-
self, show whether or not the anti-commandeering doctrine should
be vigorously enforced. However, to the extent that this theory of
federalism is relevant, it does suggest that supporters of the anti-
commandeering doctrine might be correct in drawing attention to
its use in the specific context of homeland security, given that the
Framers specifically extended federalism to this area.
CONCLUSION
Accepting that federalism can provide an important guaranty of
liberty and security does not, on its own, justify meaningful adher-
ence to the doctrine in the post-September 11, post-Katrina era.
Embodying a Machiavellian approach, more than one commenta-
tor has suggested that, in the War on Terror, "[t]he important
thing, indeed the only thing, is to win the war."1 7 The same can be
said regarding all kinds of life-threatening domestic emergencies.
After all, a free society bears few fruits for those no longer alive to
enjoy them.
315. Young, Balance ofFederalism, supra note 5, at 1257-733. In practice, the plausibility
that local officials would offer meaningful resistance to federal assistance with an attack on
their own community seems unlikely, particularly given the actual reaction to events such as
the Oklahoma City Bombing and September 11. See alsoYoung, Welcome to the Dark Side, supra
note 5, at 1292 ("But the Justice never explained why, given pervasive bonds of political
party and shared administration of existing programs that tie state, local, and national offi-
cials together, as well as their common accountability to the same constituents, state and
local governments would ignore a request for support from national officials on a matter of
imminent national emergency.").
316. Graham, supra note 67, at A7 ("Civil liberties groups have warned that the mili-
tary's expanded involvement in homeland defense could bump up against the Posse
Comitatus Act of 1878, which restricts the use of troops in domestic law enforcement."). See
also Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000); 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2000).
317. LEDEEN, supra note 72, at 237.
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Following the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York,
some drew the lesson that "[t]he era of states' rights decisions, a
luxury of tranquil times, now seems like a vestige of a bygone
era."s ' Conscious reflection and subsequent experience demon-
strate that this should not be the case. The Framers intentionally
incorporated emergency federalism into the Constitution. It ap-
plies even in times of sudden or grave danger. Their decision
reflected an understanding that, properly positioned, including
the states within the overall approach to national security would
produce greater efficiencies and help preserve liberty relative to
either a purely nationalized, or completely decentralized, system.
On September 11, "the last best hope for the community of
people working in or visiting the World Trade Center rested not
with national policymakers but with private firms and local public
servants, especially the first responders: fire, police, emergency
medical service, and building safety professionals.""9 Yet, some
have taken the experience of the attacks to justify a broad expan-
sion of national authority without demonstrating like vigor at the
state level. The experiences of September 11 and Hurricane
Katrina demonstrate that the states can, and should, play a role in
protecting the United States. This remains particularly true with
regard to homeland security. While there are numerous ways in
which the states might aid in the War on Terror and during times
of national emergency, they can only do so if their participation is
provided with constitutional legitimacy. Properly understood, the
doctrine of emergency federalism accomplishes just that.
318. Greenhouse, supra note 5.
319. 9/11 REPoRr, supranote 14, at278.
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